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1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
The human mind is a complex system that integrates stimuli, previous knowledge, 
current motives and emotional states to define actual behaviour. At its core stands memory, 
which is deeply involved in a broad range of psychological functions; autobiographical 
memory assists the construction of identity (Wilson & Ross, 2003), the working memory 
system allows the simultaneous processing of different stimuli (Baddeley, 2012), which is a 
core aspect of intelligence, and the elaboration of elements stored in long-term memory is what 
let us create hypothetical future scenarios (Schacter, Addis & Buckner, 2007). However, 
sometimes memory fails. As Daniel Schacter (2001) pointed out, rather than being just 
“failures”, these phenomena are more like by-products of otherwise adaptive properties. 
Indeed, they reveal how human memory works, and how it is continuously committed to bring 
coherence to the perceived world by making inferences, establishing associations and capturing 
the gist of the experience. 
One fundamental aspect that is investigated by research on memory is how emotional 
events are remembered, and how memory errors for emotional events are produced. From an 
evolutionary point of view, emotional memory is critical because it is involved in acquiring 
information from events that are relevant for survival or goal achievement. Knowledge of how 
emotional events are remembered and misremembered is important not only for understanding 
the basic mechanisms of psychological functioning, but also for its implications for the 
individual and the society as a whole. In the forensic field it is crucial to establish whether 
eyewitness memory is reliable, that is whether we can trust a witness – knowing that more 
often than not the remembered events are emotionally charged (think, for example, of an 
accident, a theft or an assault); erroneous memories in this context may lead to wrongful 
convictions. Also in clinical psychology, emotional memory is deeply involved. Patients are 
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often required to think back, describe and re-assess emotional events of their personal past; 
understanding how these events are stored in memory and how they may be subject to 
transformation and re-elaboration over time, could be relevant for the practice of psychological 
therapy. 
Luckily, memory for emotional events is often protected against errors compared to 
memory for ordinary events (e.g. Kensinger & Schacter, 2005, 2008). However, this protective 
effect does not always hold true, and it may depend on several factors, including conditions 
under which the encoding of the event occurred, the type of to-be-remembered material, stable 
traits and cognitive characteristics of the individual, and the specific affective state of the 
rememberer (e.g. Christianson, 1992). 
In the first part of this dissertation I will briefly describe the methods that have 
traditionally been employed to investigate false memory and memory distortion, as well as how 
they have been applied to the study of memory for emotional material, and which results they 
brought. In the second part I will report on a series of experiments that I have conducted on 
memory errors for emotional events using a recently developed false memory paradigm that is 
based on pictorial scripted material. Through five experiments, I will describe how inferential 
memory errors are affected by the presentation of emotional material, and how this effect is 
moderated by a series of variables including conditions at encoding, post-encoding elaboration 
of the material and individual differences. The relevance of the results, particularly taking into 
account the novelty of the paradigm, will be highlighted. 
 
1.1. A brief history of research on false memory and memory distortion 
 
Our memory is constructive and reconstructive in nature. It encodes schemas rather than 
mere sensations, it stores the gist of the events, and strives to make sense of what happens 
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(Alba & Hasher, 1983; Bartlett, 1932). This implies that what our memory encodes goes 
beyond the actually presented information, and the “excessive” information may sometimes be 
mistaken as genuine. Indeed, as it has been widely demonstrated by research, memory 
distortions and false memories – often associated with high vividness and confidence – are a 
common fact in everyday life (e.g. Loftus, 2005; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Bernstein and 
Loftus (2009) go so far as to claim that “all memory is false to some degree (...) memory is 
inherently a reconstructive process” (p. 373). 
Psychological research has investigated memory distortions for almost a century, 
employing a range of different methods. Bartlett (1932) was a pioneer in showing that memory 
representations of complex events are not accurate and stable traces that are permanently stored 
in our mind. He required his participants to learn narrative material that belonged to a cultural 
background they were unfamiliar with (i.e. a Native American legend called The War of 
Ghosts) and tested their memory after time periods of increasing duration. He found that 
participants were prone to distort memory of the original content on the basis of the narrative 
schemas that were typical of their cultural background, and observed that this tendency was 
increasingly evident after longer periods of time. Since then, a line of research has 
systematically investigated how our memory is influenced, and sometimes deceived, by the 
reliance on schemas and previous knowledge (e.g., Alba & Hasher, 1983; Brewer & Treyens, 
1981). For example, it has been shown that elements that are typical of specific contexts are 
also highly likely to be remembered after having observed material depicting that context, even 
though they were not actually presented; for example, it is possible to misremember having 
seen a teddy bear after having studied a photograph representing a children playroom 
(Friedman, 1979). Highly typical information is also likely to be misremembered after having 
encoded material referring to recurrent and stereotypical events (also named “scripts”); for 
example, it is likely to remember information about ordering food after having read a text 
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which describes going to a restaurant, even though that specific information was omitted 
(Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979). 
The previously described examples of false memories could be defined as self-generated, 
as they stem from mental processes that are essentially endogenous. Other studies have used 
external cues for inducing memory distortions and false memories on encoded material. For 
example, Elizabeth Loftus initiated a line of research that focuses on how memory of events 
can be manipulated by mean of external information received after encoding (Loftus, 1979; 
Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978). Since then, a series of experiments that used various types of 
post-encoding misleading information (or “misinformation”; Loftus, 2005) have shown that 
this procedure is effective not only to investigate how minor aspects of an event’s memory 
trace can be modified, but also to demonstrate that individuals can be induced with relative 
ease to remember detailed accounts of entire events that never took place (Loftus & Pickrell, 
1995). Crucially, these suggestibility paradigms normally require to present misleading 
information not just once, but repeatedly over subsequent sessions. Doing so, participants can 
be effectively led to produce and consolidate vivid mental representations of the suggested 
events, to the point that these representations cannot be distinguished from actual memories – a 
phenomenon that is known as imagination inflation (Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 
1996; Mazzoni & Memon, 2003). The misinformation procedure has proven effective in 
showing how a majority of individuals can be led to produce false memories – sometimes with 
dramatic results; for example, in a recent study Shaw and Porter (2015) reported that 70% of 
their 126 participants had been effectively misled to falsely remember having committed 
various types of crimes (including assault with a weapon) in their early adolescence. 
The large amount of research that has been conducted on false memory was originally 
motivated by forensic application. The 90s saw the so-called “memory wars”, i.e. a widespread 
dispute between some psychotherapists and memory researchers that took place over the 
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reliability of repressed memories. Indeed, it was reported that a number of patients emerged 
from psychotherapy sessions claiming that they had recalled memories from a remote past, 
usually childhood, and accusing parents and relatives of violence, sexual abuse, or other 
crimes, which led to a series of court cases (Schacter, 1996). Still now the controversy is not 
fully settled (Patihis, Ho, Tingen, Lilienfeld, & Loftus, 2014). This highlights the great 
importance of increasing and disseminating knowledge, especially among the general public 
and in the forensic contexts, about the phenomenon of false memory, with special regard to 
emotional events. 
The procedure that was perhaps most widely used to investigate false memories during 
the last two decades was the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm (DRM; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995; see Gallo, 2006, 2010, for extensive reviews). This paradigm consists of 
word lists being presented during the encoding phase. All the words within each list are 
semantically related to each other, and they all converge to a single non-presented “critical 
lure”. During a subsequent memory test, participants are required to recall or recognize the 
words that were presented during the encoding phase. If the critical lure is wrongly 
remembered, then it represents a false memory. Thanks to its simplicity and versatility, the 
DRM paradigm has so far been used in hundreds of experimental studies. A typical finding is 
that false memory of the critical lures is just as likely as correct recognition of presented words, 
and that false memories are often accompanied by strong confidence and claims of clear 
remembering (Gallo, 2010). 
A majority of the findings I will refer to when discussing previous research in this field 
were obtained using the DRM paradigm. This must be taken into consideration, because DRM 
false memories have particular characteristics and point to specific theoretical implications. In 
the present dissertation I will underline some crucial differences between the implications of 
the findings obtained using the DRM paradigm and the findings obtained using the inferential 
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memory paradigm that I employed in the current series of experiments. The two main theories 
that explain DRM false memories are the “spreading of activation theory” (Roediger, Balota, & 
Watson, 2001) and the “Fuzzy-Trace theory” (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002): the former theorizes 
that DRM false memories derive from processes of spreading of activation through a human 
memory system conceptualized as a network of interrelated nodes (i.e. when the related 
concept are presented, they spread activation toward the non-presented critical lure, thereby 
increasing the probability that it is falsely remembered); the latter theorizes that DRM false 
memories derive from a reliance on the semantic “gist” of a word list (i.e. the partially 
overlapping meaning of all words in a list) as opposed to the verbatim features of the encoded 
words (when they are difficult to retrieve). This suggests that the conditions that either increase 
or decrease the propensity to commit DRM false memories act by increasing or decreasing the 
spreading of activation through the memory nodes, or by encouraging the reliance on semantic 
gist of related concepts instead of favouring encoding of item-specific features. For example, 
counterintuitive as it may seem, a common finding is that adults are more likely than children 
to commit DRM false memories; this is the effect of age improvements in semantic memory, 
which facilitates gist reliance in adults compared to children (Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008). 
Similarly, adults who are encouraged to memorize words using a strategy based on semantic 
relatedness later commit more DRM false memories than adults who are encouraged to use an 
item-specific strategy (McCabe, Presmanes, Robertson, & Smith, 2004). 
 Other types of false memories have also been studied. In particular, false memories 
based on inferential processes are of great interest for understanding the reconstructive 
processes of memory, and also for their potentially immediate application to the field of 
eyewitness memory. Inference-based memory errors are conceptually similar to the previously 
described memory distortions deriving from the use of schemas (e.g. Friedman, 1979; Bower et 
al., 1979). Hannigan and Reinitz (2001) described two types of inference-based false 
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memories, i.e. schematic gap-filling errors and backward inference causal errors. The authors 
used sequences of photographs organized in “scripts” (i.e. real life episodes representing 
typical situations, about which everyone is supposed to have previous knowledge; Bower et al., 
1979) as material during the encoding phase; subsequently, they tested recognition memory for 
presented and non-presented photographs. Gap-filling errors refer to the erroneous recognition 
of a photograph depicting an event that is highly typical of the script (similarly to the schematic 
errors described by Bower et al., 1979), while causal errors refer to the false recognition of a 
photograph depicting the specific, episodic antecedent of which the consequence had been seen 
(Hannigan & Reinitz, 2001). Recently, Lyons, Ghetti, and Cornoldi (2010), and Mirandola, 
Paparella, Re, and Ghetti, (2012) used a conceptually identical version of this paradigm in 
studies on the development of false memories, confirming and extending evidence in favour of 
its validity as a false memory paradigm. A key advantage of this paradigm lies in its ecological 
relevance; indeed, sequences of photographs depicting real persons involved in everyday life 
events resemble the actual use of memory more than series of unordered words (as in the 
DRM); on the other hand, one disadvantage lies in the difficulty to create the material, and to 
finely control for all the aspects of the stimuli (such as valence and arousal, as it will be 
discussed below). In conclusion, paradigms investigating inference-based false memories have 
high ecological value and examine memory errors deriving from self-generated reconstructive 
processes; however, they have not been systematically employed in research until now. 
 
1.2. The memory-emotion interplay 
 
Emotions enhance memory – with some exceptions 
Emotions powerfully affect memory, and may they have contrasting effects. Most 
research indicates that emotionally charged contents are remembered better than non-emotional 
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ones, both objectively and subjectively. Remembrance of real life emotional events is more 
lasting and accurate compared to remembrance of ordinary events (Christianson, 1992; 
Kensinger & Schacter, 2008); similarly, memory for emotionally arousing stimuli (both 
positive and negative) is enhanced and better preserved over time compared to memory for 
neutral stimuli (e.g., Bradley, Greenwald, Petry, & Lang, 1992). At the subjective level, 
memory for emotional stimuli is more likely to be associated to a vivid feeling of recollection 
compared to neutral stimuli (Ochsner, 2000). Accurate and subjectively compelling memories 
of emotional events have an obvious evolutionary rationale, as it is crucial to carefully keep 
trace of the events that are most relevant for survival and goal achievement. A specific pattern 
of enhanced neural activation, that involves interactions between the amygdala and the 
hippocampus, has been described as the basis of emotion-enhanced memory, especially in the 
case of negatively arousing material (Hamann, 2001; Kensinger & Schacter, 2005). 
However, the enhancing effect of emotions on memory is not found in any condition or 
for any aspect of memory. High levels of arousal, especially if negative, may impair some 
aspects of memory reliability (e.g. Christianson, 1992; Deffenbacher, 1983; Deffenbacher, 
Bornstein, Penrod, & McGorty, 2004); in particular, it may lead memory to be narrowed to the 
core details of a scene at the expense of the peripheral ones, particularly when an arousing 
attention magnet – such as a weapon – appears on the scene (e.g. Christianson & Loftus, 1991; 
Reisberg & Heuer, 2004). This phenomenon is generally defined as emotion-induced memory 
trade-off (Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2006), and has been attributed to its 
evolutionary relevance; indeed, it may be adaptive to quickly detect and direct attention toward 
threatening stimuli, even if it means overlooking the surrounding details (Öhman, Flykt, & 
Esteves, 2001). However, there is also evidence that in absence of attention magnets, 
emotionally charged events may lead to improved memory for both the central and the 
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peripheral aspects of the scene (Laney, Campbell, Heuer, & Reisberg, 2004). See Levine and 
Edelstein (2009) for a comprehensive review on these findings. 
While a majority of studies describe the effects of arousal on memory (or confound 
arousal and valence), the single role of valence must also to be considered. Indeed, positive and 
negative events with similar levels of arousal may differently affect memory. For example, in a 
real life memory study, Kensinger and Schacter (2006a) found that those participants who had 
experienced an event that was either positively or negatively arousing could similarly 
remember it with high subjective vividness over time. However, those who had experienced 
negative events had greater memory consistency compared to those who had experienced 
positive events, suggesting greater stability of the memory trace in the case of negative events 
(Kensinger & Schacter, 2006a). Also laboratory analysis on neural memory network activity 
shows that, even with equal levels of arousal, stimuli associated with positive vs. negative 
valence have different effects on memory; specifically, negative information induces larger and 
more widespread neural activity in the memory system compared to positive information, 
indicating an increased elaboration and a deeper effect (Mickley Steinmetz, Addis, & 
Kensinger, 2010). Consistent with it, unlike emotion-enhanced memory for positive material, 
emotion-enhanced memory for negative material seems automatic and less dependent on 
conscious attention (Talmi, Schimmack, Paterson, & Moscovitch, 2007). 
 
Do emotions reduce false memories? 
While research on the interplay between emotion and memory has a long history, specific 
research on how emotions influence the occurrence of false memories is relatively recent. Just 
as in the case of general aspects of memory, effects of emotions on false memories are nuanced 
(Kaplan, Van Damme, Levine, & Loftus, 2015). On the one hand, emotional material – 
especially negative – was found to reduce memory distortions (e.g. Kensinger & Corkin, 2004; 
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Kensinger, O’Brien, Swanberg, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2007; Kensinger & Schacter 2005, 
2006b; Pesta, Murphy, & Sanders, 2001); on the other hand, other studies reported boosted 
false memories (Brainerd, Stein, Silveira, Rohenkohl, & Reyna, 2008; Gallo, Foster, & 
Johnson, 2009).  
One crucial aspect that seems to explain the contrasting findings is which type of stimuli 
is shown at encoding, and thus which paradigm is used. As in the case of emotional memory in 
general, emotionality of the material may increase item’s distinctiveness, consequently leading 
to more detailed encoding and reduced false memories related to emotional items (e.g. 
Kensinger & Corkin, 2004). In particular, emotional content seems to facilitate reality-
monitoring ability (Kensinger et al., 2007; Kensinger & Schacter, 2005, 2006b), a term that 
refers to be ability to discriminate whether the source of an event’s memory trace was external 
or internal (Johnson & Raye, 1981). False memory itself can be interpreted as a failure in the 
reality-monitoring process (Gallo & Roediger, 2002); therefore, if negative content improves 
this ability, it also reduces the occurrence of false memories. 
While distinctiveness may account for the reduced occurrence of false memories, other 
aspects of emotional material may have the opposite effect. In particular, studies on false 
memories conducted using categorized material, for example, the DRM procedure, found that 
negative content is more likely to give rise to false memories than neutral content (e.g., 
Brainerd et al., 2008; Gallo et al., 2009). This has been explained in terms of emotional 
material having stronger semantic relatedness, thus boosting those associative processes (or 
reliance on the gist) that underlie false memories (Talmi & Moscovitch, 2004). In other words, 
negative categorized items share not only a common theme, but also their emotional feature, 
which would increase their confusability. In fact, equating word lists on their associative 
strength, Palmer and Dodson (2009) found that emotional (both negative and positive) material 
protected against false memories compared to neutral material; however, other studies also 
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equated associative strength but found the opposite (e.g. Brainerd et al., 2008). Recently, Choi, 
Kensinger, and Rajaram (2012) through three experiments found that, using categorized 
graphic material equated in semantic relatedness, emotional items did not boost – and even 
reduced – the probability to incur associative false memories. The fact that existing findings 
are mixed suggests that more in-depth research is needed. 
To my knowledge, how emotional content affects the occurrence of inference-based false 
memories has not yet been studied. In the present dissertation I report on a series of 
experiments examining the occurrence of inferential false memories for emotionally charged 
events. To address the issue, I used a new, highly ecological false memory paradigm, which 
investigates inference-based memory errors (as defined by Hannigan & Reinitz, 2001). The 
theoretical and practical implications will be discussed, particularly focusing on the similarities 
and differences with previous findings obtained using other false memory paradigms. 
 
1.3. Overview of the experiments 
 
The research that is described in the present dissertation has been motivated by two 
general questions. First, it investigates whether inference-based false memories are less likely 
for emotional than non-emotional events, consistently with the general notion that emotional 
material is better remembered and is associated to fewer memory distortions (Kensinger & 
Schacter 2005; Kensinger, 2007). Second and most important question, it examined whether 
the potential “protective” effect of emotional material against false memories could be 
disrupted or even reversed under certain conditions, investigating the effects of both 
experimental manipulations and individual differences. 
To examine these two questions, I created a false memory paradigm that is based on 
pictorial scripted material, following the example of Hannigan and Reinitz (2001; see also 
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Lyons et al., 2010, and Mirandola et al., 2012, for a more recent application), but adapting it to 
include emotionality as a factor. A more detailed description of the paradigm will be provided 
in the introductory section of Experiment 1, and an example of the material is shown in the 
Appendix A. 
In Experiment 1, I examined the effect of post-encoding elaboration of pictorial scripted 
material on the production of inferential false memories for negatively emotional vs. neutral 
events. Two groups of undergraduate students were administered an incidental memory test 
after having freely recalled the scripted material or having completed distracting tasks. In 
particular, it was examined: a) how the probability of committing inferential false memories 
concerning negative vs. neutral events varied in the two groups; b) whether negative events 
were actually re-elaborated to a greater extent compared to neutral events. 
In Experiments 2 and 3, I focused on the effect of sub-clinical symptoms of internalizing 
disorders on the production of inferential false memories for emotional vs. neutral events. In 
particular, in Experiment 2 I compared a group of young adults with high levels of 
internalizing symptoms (both depression and anxiety) with a group of young adults with 
medium to low levels of internalizing symptoms. In Experiment 3, I expanded the findings of 
the previous experiment by adding a positively valenced condition within the scripted material, 
and by focusing on a group of individuals with a “purely anxious” trait, that is with a high level 
of trait anxiety but medium to low level of depression symptoms. 
In Experiments 4 and 5, I focused on the role played by working memory (WM; 
Baddeley, 2000) capacity on the production of inferential false memories for neutral vs. 
positive and negative events. In particular, in Experiment 4 I examined the role played by WM 
capacity at the level of individual differences, while in Experiment 5 the results were replicated 
and expanded using an experimental condition that was intended to artificially manipulate WM 
capacity available during the encoding phase. 
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Findings from the five Experiments suggest that emotional events are indeed associated 
to reduced occurrence of inferential false memories compared to neutral events, but also that 
this protective effect is disrupted or even reversed under certain conditions. Results will be 
eventually discussed in terms of how they add to literature on emotional false memory, 
especially highlighting the innovative aspects of the present paradigm and its theoretical and 
practical implications. 
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2. IN SEARCH OF A PARADIGM FOR EXAMINING INFERENTIAL FALSE 
MEMORIES FOR EMOTIONAL EVENTS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I describe how a new paradigm for the study of emotional false memory 
has been devised and developed. Subsequently, I present a study in which it is used to 
investigate how the occurrence of inferential false memories for emotional events is affected 
by post-encoding elaboration of material. 
As I mentioned earlier, research on false memory has been importantly motivated by its 
implications for the forensic context and eyewitness testimony (Brainerd, Reyna, & Poole, 
2000). So far, the DRM paradigm (Roediger & McDermott, 1995) has provided what is 
probably the largest amount of findings on the phenomenon of false memory. As Gallo (2010) 
reported in his broad review, DRM false memory has good generalizability; for example, 
individuals who are likely to incur the DRM illusion are also likely to incur other types of false 
memories, and even autobiographical memory distortions, which suggests that the DRM 
paradigm is indeed useful to investigate processes that underlie the formation of different types 
of false memories and memory distortions (Gallo, 2010). Ultimately, however, the DRM 
procedure has the limitation that presents memory material that is distant from the real life 
experience (i.e., lists of semantically related words), and it has been criticized for being overly 
simplistic as a false memory paradigm (Pezdek & Lam, 2007). Eyewitness testimony, to give 
an example, typically involve the remembrance of visual aspects of scenes that are detailed and 
complex – and that possibly involve emotionally charged events affecting oneself or other 
individuals. Suggestibility paradigms often uses video or slides to present events about which 
misinformation is subsequently provided (Takarangi, Sophie, & Maryanne, 2006), or require 
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the imagination of autobiographical events; as I previously reviewed, these paradigms have 
proven useful to investigate the false memory phenomenon, sometimes with impressive results 
(Loftus, 2005; Shaw & Porter, 2015). However, they are exclusively focused on how external 
information is eventually incorporated into existing memory. As human memory is schematic 
and reconstructive (Alba & Hasher, 1983; Bartlett, 1932), it is also of great importance to 
understand when and how memory itself can create its illusions through inferential and 
reconstructive processes (e.g., Bower et al., 1979; Friedman, 1979; Hannigan & Reinitz, 2001). 
A new, highly ecological paradigm to study false memories for complex visual events may 
therefore be useful. 
To this end, I followed the intuition of Hannigan and Reinitz (2001) and created a false 
memory paradigm that is based on pictorial scripted material, newly adding emotionality as a 
factor. The material consisted of a series of photographs depicting typical everyday life events 
(for Experiments 1 and 2, the events include: waking up in the morning, having dinner with 
guests at home, going grocery shopping, playing in the playground, taking a bike ride, 
performing on a theatre stage, doing homework at home, going to the nurse); these events are 
also named “scripts” (Hannigan & Reinitz, 2001; Lyons et al., 2010), as it is assumed that 
everyone possesses previous knowledge about the routines that typically takes place in each of 
these cases. The emotionality of the scripts was manipulated by presenting different, mutually 
exclusive outcomes close to the end of each event at encoding; the outcomes differ in terms of 
emotional valence and arousal (in Experiments 1 and 2, one outcome was negatively arousing, 
and the other was emotionally neutral). For each script, a photograph representing the common 
cause of all the outcomes was created; this photograph is named “causal antecedent” (or 
“causal distractor”), and it is not shown at encoding, but later tested at a recognition phase. The 
false memory of the causal antecedent is considered to be a causal error. Other variables have 
also been considered; in particular, the false memory for any script-consistent but not presented 
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photograph (excluding the causal antecedent) is considered to be a “gap-filling error”, and the 
correct recognition of an actually presented photograph (named “target”) is considered to be a 
“hit”. A graphical example of one of the script that were used in this experiment is shown in 
Appendix A. In the next section, I describe an experiment in which this paradigm is used to 
investigate how post-encoding elaboration affects the production of false memories 
(specifically, causal and gap-filling errors) for emotional events. 
 
2.2 Experiment 1: The role of post-encoding elaboration1 
 
We frequently reflect and think back to past events, especially when they are emotional 
(Christianson & Engelberg, 1999; Walker, Skowronksi, Gibbons, Vogl, & Ritchie, 2009). 
While rehearsing past events may help to keep them stored in memory over time, there is also 
evidence that subsequent re-elaboration lead to the distortion of their original narrative 
structure, due to an attempt to make them more consistent with previous knowledge and to 
bring coherence in the overall story (Bartlett, 1932; Bergman & Roediger, 1999). Even in the 
seminal article on the DRM paradigm (Roediger & McDermott, 1995), the observation that 
repeated recall provoked enhanced false memory of the critical lure at a subsequent 
remembering task was reported. Rehearsal-driven distortion is of potentially high concern in 
eyewitness testimony, where the retrieval of the original memory trace is crucial; in this 
context repeated eyewitness interviews could be a problem – but it is also possible that, over 
time, the eyewitness himself spontaneously re-think of and reconstruct what has happened, 
especially if the critical events were strongly emotional. 
Relatively little research has been conducted to investigate if and how post-encoding 
elaboration stimulate false memory for emotional events. Marsh, Tversky, and Hutson (2005) 
                                                          
1
 Results reported in Experiment 1 have been partially described in the following article: Mirandola, C., Toffalini, 
E., Grassano, M., Cornoldi, C., & Melinder, A. (2014). Inferential false memories of events: Negative 
consequences protect from distortions when the events are free from further elaboration. Memory, 22, 451–461. 
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found that retelling about emotional scenes led to a greater proportion of errors in a subsequent 
memory recall tests, specifically when retelling was accompanied by an explicit request to talk 
about subjective emotional reactions to the encoded material; on the contrary, factual retelling 
did not have an impairing effect. Similarly, Drivdahl, Zaragoza, and Learned (2009) found that 
reflectively elaborating viewed material with a focus on emotional aspects led participants to 
higher propensity to incur false memories of non-viewed events that were being suggested 
through misinformation. Bornstein, Liebel, and Scarberry (1998) found that repeated memory 
testing about a violent scene slightly increased the number of memory errors, while the same 
effect was negligible for neutral scenes; however, since they focused mostly on accuracy, their 
participants produced a very low number of memory errors (not more than 1-2 per person), 
which made it difficult to perform proper analysis. Finally, and more generally, conceptual 
elaboration of viewed material has been found to increase false memory occurrence for events 
on which misinformation had been provided (Zaragoza, Mitchell, Payment, & Drivdahl, 2011). 
Since emotional events are more likely to be the focus of elaboration (Walker et al., 2009), it 
might be expected that false memories are more likely for these events than for neutral ones; to 
my knowledge, this hypothesis has not yet been tested. 
In the present study, the effect of post-encoding elaboration on the production of 
inferential false memory for negatively arousing vs. neutral events is examined. Using the 
previously outlined paradigm based on pictorial scripted material (Hannigan & Reinitz, 2001; 
Lyons et al., 2010), causal and gap-filling errors were considered. Different hypotheses were 
tested. On the one hand, it was hypothesized that emotionally arousing material would lead to 
fewer false memories, due to its higher distinctiveness and its generally beneficial effect on 
memory accuracy (Kensinger, 2007; Kensinger & Schacter, 2008). On the other hand, it was 
hypothesized that this would happen only in a control condition, while in a post-encoding 
elaboration condition emotional material was expected to boost false memories, due to its 
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higher probability of being the focus of the elaboration, which in turns is expected to entail 
those reconstructive processes that are at the basis of inferential false memory. Finally, written 
reports of post-encoding elaboration were analysed to understand whether emotional events are 
indeed more likely to be elaborated. 
It is important to note that different effects were expected on the two different types of 
inferential false memories. As both causal and gap-filling errors are thought to stem from 
reconstructive processes, it was expected that both types of errors could be similarly affected 
by post-encoding elaboration per se; the same, however, was not expected in the case of the 
effect of valence. Indeed, as it is clearly described in the Method section (see also the graphical 
representation of one of the scripts in Appendix A), due to the characteristics of the paradigm, 
only causal errors are directly linked to the specific outcomes through which valence is 
manipulated. Therefore, albeit it was not excluded that valence of an event could “spill” its 
effect over the entirety of the script in which the event is embedded , thus influencing all 
memory aspects, gap-filling errors (i.e. false memories of events that are consistent with the 
viewed episode) were not necessarily expected to be affected by valence; the same applies to 
memory accuracy (i.e. correct recognition of actually presented events within the script). 
 
2.2.1  Method 
 
Participants 
Participants were 96 undergraduate students (mean age = 24.13 years, SD = 5.01; 60 
females). They were randomly assigned to either the control group (N = 53; 39 females) or to 
the post-encoding elaboration group (N = 43; 21 females); while the former group performed 
only the recognition test after a 15-minutes retention interval during which they were 
administered filler tasks, the post-encoding elaboration group was require to perform a free 
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recall task during the retention interval, immediately before completing the recognition test. All 
participants provided written and oral consent prior to participation. The study was approved 
by the local ethical committee. 
 
Materials 
Pictorial stimuli for encoding 
Stimuli consisted of a series of colour photographs depicting 8 everyday episodes or 
“scripts”, as described before. For each episode, a series of 17 photographs were created. Out 
of them, 11 were used as targets and depicted the body of the script, i.e. typical actions that are 
likely to be performed in a particular context; other 3 photographs, similar to the previous ones, 
were used as script-consistent distractors during the recognition phase. Target and distractors 
were counterbalanced across participants. Finally, other 3 photographs for each script depicted 
a cause-effect pattern. This pattern consists of one single cause which results in two similar but 
mutually exclusive outcomes that differ in emotionality: one outcome is negatively arousing, 
while the other is neutral. Emotionality of the presented outcomes was counterbalanced across 
participants, as for each script the neutral outcome was shown to half of the participants, while 
the negative outcome was shown to the remaining half. All 8 scripts were presented one after 
the other without interruptions, following the procedure already adopted in studies that used 
similar versions of this paradigm (e.g. Hannigan & Reinitz, 2001; Lyons et al., 2010). Actors 
and settings were different across all 8 scripts to avoid potential confusion between the 
episodes. As it is known that stimuli in the initial and final positions are better remembered 
compared to the others (i.e. primacy and recency effects), 5 script-inconsistent photographs 
were shown at the very beginning of the entire sequence, and other 5 were shown at the very 
end. A total of 106 photographs were shown during the encoding phase. 
Assessment of emotionality of the pictorial stimuli for encoding 
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Prior to the experiment, a pilot study was conducted to make sure that the 16 photographs 
representing the outcomes (i.e. 8 neutral and 8 negative outcomes) were actually emotional or 
non-emotional as they were intended to be. To this end, 11 undergraduate students (who did 
not subsequently participated in the main experiment) rated the 16 outcomes in terms of both 
valence and arousal on two 9-point scales using the SAM (Self-Assessment Manikin; Bradley 
& Lang, 1994), where 9 indicates high arousal and strongly positive valence, and 1 indicates 
low arousal and strongly negative valence (5 is the midpoint in both scales, indicating 
relatively high arousal and neutral valence respectively). Each outcome was presented for two 
seconds on a computer screen (i.e., in a condition similar to that of the main experiment), and 
was followed by a self-paced rating phase. Means, standard deviations, and 95% confidence 
intervals of the means (based on t distribution) for the ratings of valence and arousal of the 
outcomes were as follows: 
 Valence of neutral outcomes, M = 5.96, SD = 1.05, 95% CI [5.74, 6.18]; 
 Valence of negative outcomes, M = 3.28, SD = 1.12, 95% CI [3.05, 3.51]; 
 Arousal of neutral outcomes, M = 3.15, SD = 1.48, 95% CI [2.84, 3.46]; 
 Arousal of negative outcomes, M = 5.50, SD = 1.30, 95% CI [5.23, 5.77]. 
The differences between neutral and negative outcomes were thus large on both valence 
and arousal: for valence, Cohen’s d = 2.47; for arousal, Cohen’s d = 1.69 (see Cohen, 1988, for 
an interpretation of the effect size). 
Pictorial stimuli for recognition 
A sequence of 80 photographs was shown during the recognition test. Photographs were 
presented in a randomized order. For each episode, 4 target photographs, 3 script-consistent 
distractors and, crucially, the photograph depicting the cause whose outcome had been shown 
during the encoding phase, were tested. The remaining 16 photographs were script-
inconsistent, half of which were actually shown during the encoding phase. 
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Procedure 
Participants were told that they would see a series of photographs depicting typical 
situations in which youths do different daily activities. As the encoding was incidental, 
participants were not told about the memory test, and were only required to pay attention to the 
sequence of photographs, to understand what they represent. Photographs were presented on a 
computer screen place at about 50 centimetres from the participant’s head; photographs were 
shown for 2 seconds each, and were divided by black slides lasting 2 seconds as the 
interstimuli. For each script, 12 photographs were shown in adjacent positions and in logical 
order. 
During a subsequent 15 minutes retention interval, participants in the control group 
completed a version of the Stroop Test (D-KEFS Colour-Word Interference Test; Delis, 
Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001) the scores of which were not further considered, as this was used 
only as a filler task to prevent participants from re-elaborating the encoded material. On the 
contrary, participants in the post-encoding elaboration group were given pencil and paper, and 
were asked make an effort to remember and describe what they had just seen, and specifically 
to try to “narrate” the episodes by writing them down. 
The final recognition test was identical for the two groups, and was self-paced. For each 
photograph, participants were required to respond either “yes” or “not” based on whether they 
thought that they had seen that photograph among those that were presented during the 
encoding phase or not. 
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2.2.2  Results 
 
All analyses were performed using R (R Core Team, 2015). Generalized mixed-effects 
models were run using the package “lme4” (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). 
Graphical effects were obtained using the package “effects” (Fox, 2003). 
Response variables were obtained from responses provided by participants during the 
recognition test. Three types of responses were provided: responses to targets, responses to 
script-consistent distractors, and responses to causal distractors. As all the responses were of a 
binomial type (“yes”: 1, or “no”: 0), they were analysed using logistic mixed-effects models 
(Baayen, 2008; Jaeger, 2008). The “yes” responses to causal and script-consistent distractors 
were considered as causal and gap-filling errors respectively, while “yes” responses to target 
photographs were hits. In all three cases, the fixed effects that were tested were Group (with 2 
levels: control group vs. post-encoding elaboration group), Valence (with 2 levels: neutral vs. 
negative), and their interaction. Random effects were Participants and Photographs. Likelihood 
ratio tests for nested models based on the chi-square distribution (Pinheiro & Bates, 2000) were 
used to assess the significance of both fixed and random effects; the significance of the random 
effects was calculated by removing them, one at a time, from the full model. Furthermore, 
given the well-known limitations of the p-value significance test (Burnham & Anderson, 
2002), an information-criterion approach was also used. In particular, the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1974) was reported for each model (lower AIC indicates better 
model); furthermore, evidence ratio based on the Akaike weights was used to quantify the 
evidence in favour of the existence of each fixed effect. The evidence ratio was calculated as 
Exp((AIC1-AIC2)/2), following the procedure suggested by Wagenmakers and Farrell (2004). 
In the present case, evidence ratio indicates how many times a model that includes a certain 
fixed effect is more likely to be the best model (in terms of minimizing the Kullback–Leibler 
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discrepancy; Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004) compared to the corresponding model that 
excludes that effect. 
 
Causal errors 
For causal errors, no significant main effect of Group emerged, χ2(1) = .97, p = .32 
(model with Group: AIC = 904.38; model without Group: AIC = 903.36; evidence ratio = 
0.60). Also, no significant main effect of Valence was found, χ2(1) = .11, p = .74 (model with 
Valence: AIC = 904.38; model without Valence: AIC = 902.49; evidence ratio = 0.39). 
However, a significant Group x Valence interaction was found on causal errors, χ2(1) = 5.53, p 
= .02 (model with the interaction: AIC = 900.85; model without the interaction: AIC = 904.38; 
evidence ratio = 5.84). Both random effects were significant: for Participants, χ2(1) = 30.97, p 
< .001 (full model: AIC = 900.85; model without Participants: AIC = 929.81); for Photographs, 
χ2(1) = 124.70, p < .001 (model without Photographs: AIC = 1023.55). The estimated 
probabilities of producing causal errors in the two groups and in the two conditions of valence 
are reported in Figure 2.1. See Table 2.1 for detailed information on the model, including 
estimated parameters and odds ratios. 
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Figure 2.1. Estimated probability of causal error by Group and Valence for Experiment 1. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Gap-filling errors 
For gap-filling errors, a significant main effect of Group was found, χ2(1) = 5.32, p = .02 
(model with Group: AIC = 2380.70; model without Group: AIC = 2384.0; evidence ratio = 
5.21); analysis of parameters (see Table 2.1) indicated that the probability of producing gap-
filling errors was higher in the post-encoding elaboration group than in the control group. No 
significant main effect of Valence was found, χ2(1) = 1.52, p = .22 (model with Valence: AIC = 
2380.7; model without Valence: AIC = 2380.2; evidence ratio = 0.78). Furthermore, no 
significant Group x Valence interaction emerged on gap-filling errors, χ2(1) = .69, p = .41 
(model with the interaction: AIC = 2382.0; model without the interaction: AIC = 2380.7; 
evidence ratio = 0.52). Both random effects were significant: for Participants, χ2(1) = 204.04, p 
< .001 (full model: AIC = 2380.7; model without Participants: AIC = 2582.7); for Photographs, 
χ2(1) = 326.26, p < .001 (model without Photographs: AIC = 2704.9). The estimated 
probabilities of producing gap-filling errors in the two groups and in the two conditions of 
valence are reported in Figure 2.2. See Table 2.1 for detailed information on the model. 
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Figure 2.2. Estimated probability of Gap-filling Error by Group and Valence for Experiment 1. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Accuracy 
For hits, no significant main effect of Group was found, although a tendency emerged, 
χ2(1) = 3.40, p = .07 (model with Group: AIC = 2917.2; model without Group: AIC = 2918.6; 
evidence ratio = 2.01); contrasts indeed showed that the probability of producing Hits was 
slightly higher in the control group than in the post-encoding elaboration group. No significant 
main effect of Valence was found either, χ2(1) = .60, p = .44 (model with Valence: AIC = 
2917.2; model without Valence: AIC = 2915.8; evidence ratio = 0.50). Finally, no significant 
Group x Valence interaction emerged on Hits, χ2(1) = 1.38, p = .24 (model with the interaction: 
AIC = 2917.8 ; model without the interaction: AIC = 2917.2; evidence ratio = 0.74). As no 
significant fixed effects were found, significance of random effects are not reported. The 
estimated probabilities of Hits in the two groups and in the two conditions of valence are 
however displayed in Figure 2.3. See Table 2.1 for detailed information on the model. 
 
Figure 2.3. Estimated accuracy (i.e. probability of hit) by Group and Valence for Experiment 
1. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 2.1. Fixed effects of Group, Valence, and Group x Valence on causal errors, gap-filling 
errors and hits, in Experiment 1, using logistic mixed-effects models. 
Fixed effect B SE Odds ratio χ2(df) 
Dependent variable: Causal errors 
    
Group 
   
.97 (1) 
      Post-encoding elaboration .25 .25 1.29 
 
Valence 
   
.11 (1) 
      Negative -.06 .17 .94 
 
Group x Valence 
   
5.53* (1) 
      Post-encoding elab. x Negative .84 .35 2.31* 
 
Dependent variable: Gap-filling errors 
    
Group 
   
5.32* (1) 
      Post-encoding elaboration .56 .24 1.76* 
 
Valence 
   
1.52 (1) 
      Negative .13 .11 1.14 
 
Group x Valence 
   
.69 (1) 
      Post-encoding elab. x Negative .18 .21 1.20 
 
Dependent variable: Hits 
    
Group 
   
3.40 (1) 
      Post-encoding elaboration -.31 .16 .74 
 
Valence 
   
.60 (1) 
      Negative -.08 .16 .93 
 
Group x Valence 
   
1.38 (1) 
      Post-encoding elab. x Negative .23 .19 1.28 
 
Note. Baseline category for Group was "control group", baseline category for Valence was 
“neutral”. Random effects were Participants and Photographs. Number of observations was 
768 for causal errors, 2304 for gap-filling errors, and 3072 for hits. Number of photographs 
was 8 for causal errors, 48 for gap-filling errors, and 56 for hits. Number of participants = 96. 
*p < .05. 
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Additional analysis on recalled scripts in the post-encoding elaboration group 
As it was hypothesized that post-encoding elaboration would moderate the effects of 
valence on recognition via a preferential focus on emotional aspects, free-recall reports from 
participants in the post-encoding elaboration group were examined. Because instructions were 
informal, generally requiring to describe “what happened” in the viewed episodes, it was 
difficult to define quantitative variables from the written reports; however, it was possible to 
define which scripts were mentioned by each participants and which were not (as a proxy for 
which scripts were at least partially elaborated and which were not). Two independent judges 
read the reports and assigned, for each participant, “1” to scripts that were mentioned and “0” 
to scripts that were not mentioned. Very few cases of discrepancy between the two judges were 
discussed together until an agreement was reached. 
As expected, mixed effects logistic regression (with scripts and participants as random 
effects) showed that valence had a significant effect on probability of mentioning scripts, χ2(1) 
= 13.39, p < .001 (estimated probability of mentioning a script was .74 when valence was 
neutral and .91 when valence was negative). Having mentioned a script, however, did not in 
turn directly predict the probability of committing causal error for that script, χ2(1) < .01, p = 
.94 (estimated probability of causal errors was .39 for both mentioned and non-mentioned 
scripts), but it directly predicted the probability of committing gap-filling errors, χ2(1) = 6.24, p 
= .01 (estimated probability of gap-filling errors was .38 for mentioned scripts and .23 for non-
mentioned scripts), as well as the probability of correctly recognizing target photographs (i.e., 
the probability of hits), χ2(1) = 9.87, p = .002 (estimated probability of hits was .84 for 
mentioned scripts and .75 for non-mentioned scripts). 
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2.2.3  Discussion 
 
The present experiment newly examined the effect of post-encoding elaboration on the 
production of inference-based memory errors, particularly for negative vs. neutral events. The 
main finding was that post-encoding elaboration increased the propensity to incur causal errors 
for negatively charged (but not neutral) events. Furthermore, the elaboration increased the 
propensity to incur gap-filling errors across the board. The results generally confirmed the 
expectations, although with some exceptions. 
With regard to causal errors, the opposite patterns that emerged in the two groups were 
predicted on the basis of previous literature; indeed, the fact that participants who only 
performed the recognition task (without further re-elaboration) were less likely to incur 
negative than neutral false memories is consistent with the idea that emotional material 
encourage a more detailed and careful encoding, thus reducing distortions and false memories 
(Kensinger & Schacter, 2006b; Pesta et al., 2001). On the contrary, participants who re-
elaborated the viewed episodes showed the opposite pattern. A two-step process was 
hypothesized to underlie this finding. First, it is known that emotionally charged events are 
more likely to be the focus of subsequent elaboration (Christianson & Engelberg, 1999; Walker 
et al., 2009), and indeed participants in the present study were more likely to mention the 
episodes having a negative outcome than those having a neutral outcome. Second, it is known 
that rehearsal of encoded material may lead to increased memory intrusions (e.g. Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995; Zaragoza et al., 2011), likely due to boosted reconstructive processes, in an 
attempt to bring coherence to the complexity of an event (Bergman & Roediger, 1999). 
Reconstructive processes may have been particularly relevant in the case of inference-based 
memory errors, which I examined in the present dissertation.  
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With regard to gap-filling errors, an across-the-board increase in the occurrence of false 
memories was observed. No interaction between group and valence emerged in this case, but it 
was expected; indeed, valence was manipulated through the outcomes of the episodes, which 
are temporally continuous and logically tied to the photographs representing the causal 
antecedents of the outcomes (i.e. to the causal errors), while they are less strictly related to the 
rest of the script. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that post-encoding elaboration increased 
the tendency to produce false memories concerning aspects that fill the gaps between the 
scenes, thus confirming the notion that reconstructing an event leads in fact to manipulate and 
possibly distort the original memory trace (as first suggested by Bartlett, 1932). Consistently 
with this view, additional analysis showed that gap-filling errors (as well as hits) were more 
likely for episodes that were mentioned (and thus, to a certain extent, re-elaborated) than for 
those that were not mentioned in the written reports. 
Some aspects still remain unclear, and raise new questions. First, it could be expected to 
observe a main effect of group not only for gap-filling errors, but also for causal errors; indeed, 
while the group-valence interaction in the latter case is of great interest, it is not clear why 
post-encoding elaboration did not increase, albeit to a smaller extent, also the probability of 
incurring neutral causal errors. Furthermore, although emotional episodes were more likely to 
be mentioned, being mentioned did not in turn directly increase causal errors probability. One 
hypothesis is that, since causal errors stem from an inferential elaboration concerning a very 
specific episodic aspect, an episode just being mentioned in its entirety is not a proper index of 
the fact that the specific causal episode has been elaborated. This should be investigate by more 
in-depth research. In general, however, a limitation of the present study is that the amount of 
evidence in favour of the effects, both in the case of causal and gap-filling errors, was not 
large. Furthermore, also the size of the effects (as it can be seen from the estimated probability 
in the figures, as well as from the odds ratios in Table 2.1) is limited; the estimated probability 
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of gap-filling errors goes from around .20 in the control group to around .30 in the post-
encoding elaboration group, while the probability of causal errors in the negative episodes goes 
from just below .30 in the control group to just above .40 in the post-encoding elaboration 
group. This suggest that a large portion of these probabilities depend on other aspects, which 
will need to be investigated. Finally, in the present experiment valence and arousal were 
inherently confounded; showing negatively arousing events was decided in order to resemble 
ecological situations that could be forensic-relevant (i.e. memory of potential crimes); 
however, future research may try to extend the results presenting positive events or low-arousal 
negative events. 
Despite some limitations, the present study offers important suggestions, and practical 
implications can be derived. Indeed, while rehearsal and memory testing may help to improve 
long-term retention (e.g. Roediger & Karpicke, 2006), the present study indicates that free, 
unguided elaboration of witnessed events may have undesired effects, such as increasing 
inferential false memories. From a forensic point of view, this may indicate that repeated 
interviews should be avoided, especially with regard to negatively charged events; however, it 
may be interesting for future research to investigate how post-encoding elaboration (assuming 
that in certain cases it is inescapable) could be guided to minimize the occurrence of inference-
based memory errors.  
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3. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN THE OCCURRENCE OF INFERENTIAL 
FALSE MEMORIES FOR EMOTIONAL EVENTS IN INDIVIDUALS WITH 
EMOTIONAL PROBLEMS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As previously mentioned, the memory-emotion interplay has been considered not only 
with regard to the emotionality of encoded material, but also in terms of how mood and 
affective states influence memory performance, as well as how the two aspects interact. Bower 
(1981) was one of the first who systematically studied and reported effects of mood-
congruency, i.e. effects by which memory is facilitated when material is characterized by the 
same emotional valence as the affective state of the rememberer. This phenomenon has been 
reported also in the case of false memories (Ruci, Tomes, & Zelenski, 2009); as the authors 
used the DRM paradigm, they argued that this was due to increased activation of the memory 
nodes that are related to current mood, which would make them more easily accessible. While 
a number of studies investigated the effect of transient mood states on false memory (e.g. 
Storbeck & Clore, 2011), relatively little is known about the effects of stable and long-lasting 
conditions, such as individual traits or emotional disorders (i.e. depression and anxiety). While 
transient negative mood may have beneficial effects on memory and even on other general 
aspects of cognitive functioning (Forgas, 2013), long-lasting depression has opposite and 
clearly deleterious effects (Burt, Zembar, & Niederehe, 1995; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). 
Emotional disorders are in general characterized by specific patterns of reasoning, attitude and 
interpretations of the events. Specifically, depression is accompanied by “increased elaboration 
of negative information, by difficulties disengaging from negative material, and by deficits in 
cognitive control when processing negative information” (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). 
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Similarly, anxiety is characterized by attentional and memory biases for negative stimuli, 
especially if they are threat-related (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & 
van Ijzendoorn, 2007; Mitte, 2008). Both anxiety and depression thus entail an abnormal 
processing of negative information, which in various ways seems to affect memory. Detecting 
the specific cognitive biases that underlie emotional disorders is important to understand which 
mechanisms are involved in their pathogenesis and maintenance. Emotional disorders 
themselves have been conceptualized as a vicious circle between a systematically biased 
interpretation of the world and the resulting clinical symptoms (Teasdale, 1983); in this light, 
enhanced memory accessibility of negative information may therefore exacerbate emotional 
symptoms (Joormann, Teachman, & Gotlib, 2009). 
Research began to investigate emotional false memory in individuals with emotional 
disorders only recently, and existing evidence is still partial and have limitations. One common 
finding is that individuals with depressive disorder are more prone than the general population 
to falsely remember negatively charged emotional items (Howe & Malone, 2011; Joormann et 
al., 2009; Moritz, Voigt, Arzola, & Otte, 2008; Yeh & Hua, 2009). Although it is not yet fully 
clear what is the mechanism that underlies this phenomenon, a popular hypothesis is that 
depression is characterized by an increase in “resting” activation level of negative nodes within 
the memory network; as a consequence, spontaneous false memories related to negative 
concepts would be more likely to be committed, due to their higher baseline accessibility 
(Howe & Malone, 2011; Joormann et al., 2009). It is important to note that this explanation is 
well suited to the DRM paradigm, which is the procedure that – at least to my knowledge – has 
been used in all published studies on emotional false memories in individuals with depression 
and anxiety. This points to a limitation of the existing literature. Indeed, it is not clear what 
would happen using different paradigms, and investigating false memories that do not arise 
from spreading of activation or reliance on semantic gist, as in the case of the DRM paradigm. 
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Furthermore, it is unknown what would happen when false memories stem from the 
interpretation of an emotional context even without testing inherently emotional items; this 
investigation is made possible by the inferential memory paradigm that was used in 
Experiment 1, in which the critical items (the most important of which being the causal 
antecedents, i.e. the equivalent of the “critical lures”) are all non-emotional per se. 
Aside from the type of false memory, other points that require further investigation are: 
a) whether enhanced false memory for negative material is specific to emotional problems that 
reach the clinical level, or may also be found in sub-clinical conditions; b) what happens when 
using positive material, as it is known that emotional disorders are characterized by abnormal 
elaboration of all emotional information, including positive one (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010); 
and c) whether the false memory bias is specific to depression, or it can be found also in the 
case of anxiety (i.e. the other important type of emotional disorder). With regard to the first 
point, Stea, Lee, and Sears (2013) recently found that individuals suffering from dysphoria at 
the sub-clinical level were more likely to commit false memory for negative DRM lists 
compared to control individuals; however, the pattern or results that they reported was not fully 
clear, as they also found increased correct recognition of negative items in dysphoric 
individuals, indicating the possibility of a response bias to negative material rather than a 
genuine false memory effect (Stea et al., 2013). Nonetheless, it is well known that sub-clinical 
symptoms of emotional disorders can be characterized by biases in cognitive processing of 
emotional material (e.g. Joormann, 2010; Krompinger & Simons, 2009; Mitte, 2008). With 
regard to the second point evidence is mixed. Indeed, while some studies (Howe & Malone, 
2011; Joormann et al., 2009) found that the false memory bias accompanying depression was 
specific to negative or depression-relevant material, Moritz, Gläscher, and Brassen (2005) 
found a false memory bias generalized to all emotionally charged material; they suggested that 
this could be due to the fact that depressive thinking in fact involve rumination on positive 
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concepts, although in a negative light (e.g. the “happiness” that is missing, the “joy of living” 
that has been lost, and so on). Indeed, there is evidence that depression is characterized by 
abnormal cognitive processing of both negative and positive information (e.g. Gotlib & 
Joormann, 2010). Finally, with regard to the last point, only one published study could be 
found on the effect of anxiety on emotional false memories, and it failed to find the expected 
result (Wenzel, Jostad, Brendle, Ferraro, & Lystad, 2004); however, the authors examined only 
individuals with specific phobias and tested false memories using DRM word lists having 
participants’ own phobic objects as the critical lures. This may have led to a mix of different 
processes: enhanced accessibility to the critical lure, which would increase false memory 
occurrence, and its rejection on the basis of the perceived salience and memorability (e.g. “Had 
I seen it, I would have certainly noticed!” – following a process similar to that described by 
Ghetti, 2003; see also the “distinctiveness heuristic”, Dodson & Schacter, 2002). 
Hereinafter I describe two experiments that adds to the existing literature by examining 
new hypotheses concerning the relationship between anxiety and depression symptoms and the 
production of inferential false memories for emotional events. To this purpose, the same 
paradigm based on pictorial scripted material that was used in Experiment 1 has been 
employed. While in Experiment 2 I focused on individuals with strong presence of 
internalizing symptoms, in Experiment 3 the specific case of trait anxiety was considered; 
furthermore, in Experiment 3 positively charged material was included in the paradigm. The 
specific hypotheses are detailed below. 
 
 
 
 
  
39 
 
3.2 Experiment 2: The role of sub-clinical internalizing symptoms2 
 
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to investigate inferential false memories for 
emotionally charged events in individuals with strong internalizing symptoms. As a control 
group, individuals with average to low levels of internalizing symptoms were tested. Based on 
the extant literature, it was hypothesized that the probability of committing false memories for 
negative vs. neutral events would have shown different patterns in internalizing and control 
participants. In particular, it was expected that while negatively emotional events would have 
been accompanied by a lower probability of committing false memories compared to neutral 
events in control participants (consistently with the general notion that negative material 
reduces memory distortions; e.g. Kensinger & Schacter, 2006b, 2008), this protective effect 
would have disappeared – or would have been even reversed – in participants with strong 
internalizing symptoms. The latter case was hypothesized on the basis of previous findings on 
increased negative false memories in individuals with emotional disorders (e.g. Joormann et 
al., 2009), but bearing in mind that in the present case there are three fundamental differences, 
that have both theoretical and practical implications: a) the present study focuses on 
participants who are characterized by general internalizing symptoms at the subclinical level, 
and not by a clinical diagnosis (as it is explained below, symptoms of anxiety vs. depression 
were not considered separately because they were found to correlate very strongly, suggesting 
that it would be appropriate to merge them into a single dimension); b) inferential instead of 
associative false memories are analysed; c) the critical items that are used to test emotional 
false memories are logically linked to emotional contexts but not emotional themselves. 
Therefore, in the present case it was hypothesized that, since individuals with depressive and 
                                                          
2
 Results reported in Experiment 2 have been partially described in the following article: Toffalini, E., Mirandola, 
C., Drabik, M. J., Melinder, A., & Cornoldi, C. (2014). Emotional negative events do not protect against false 
memories in young adults with depressive-anxious personality traits. Personality and Individual Differences, 66, 
14–18. 
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anxious traits (even at the sub-clinical level) have the tendency to focus their attention, 
rehearse and over-elaborate negative material (Joormann, 2010; Mitte, 2008), they would be 
highly likely to commit inference-based false memories for negatively charged events 
(similarly to participants who were asked to re-elaborate viewed material in Experiment 1). 
Finally, just as in Experiment 1, it was expected that emotionality of material would have 
affected causal errors – to which it is more closely tied, as previously explained – but not 
necessarily the other variables. With regard to gap-filling errors and hits, they were not 
expected to vary across groups, due to the fact that significant impairments in the general 
functioning of memory would be expected in the case of clinical disorders (e.g. Burt et al., 
1995) but not at the sub-clinical level. 
 
3.2.1  Method 
 
Participants 
Participants were selected through a screening based on the Q-Pad questionnaire (Sica, 
Chiri, Favilli, & Marchetti, 2011; see Materials section) on a group of 168 students attending 
the last year of secondary education in three different high schools in Northern Italy. 
Participants who exceeded the 80
th
 percentile in the combined anxiety-depression scale of the 
Q-Pad were assigned to the “internalizing group” (N = 30, mean age = 18.38 years, SD = 1.19, 
22 females), while an equal number of participants, matched for gender and with similar age, 
who were below the 60
th
 percentile in all the Q-Pad scales expressing malaise, were assigned to 
the control group (N = 30, mean age = 18.29, SD = 1.21, 22 females). Both the screening and 
the subsequent memory experiment were conducted during the school hours. All participants 
provided written and oral consent to participate in the experiment. For all individuals under 18 
years of age, written parental permission was obtained prior to the study.  
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Materials and procedure 
The Q-Pad questionnaire 
The Q-Pad (Questionario per la valutazione della psicopatologia in adolescenza – 
Questionnaire for the assessment of psychopathology in adolescence; Sica et al., 2011) is a 
nine-scale, 81-item questionnaire that has been developed to assess the presence of common 
psychopathological symptoms within the adolescent and young-adult population, covering a 
range of dimensions that are typical of the youth malaise (the scales include body 
dissatisfaction, anxiety, depression, substance abuse, interpersonal conflicts, family issues, 
uncertainty about the future, psychosocial risk, self-esteem/well-being). Responses to items are 
given on a 4-point Likert scale ranging between 1 (completely false for me, not describing my 
situation) to 4 (completely true for me, absolutely describing my situation). Raw score of each 
scale is computed as the algebraic sum of the corresponding items. Final scores are expressed 
in percentiles based on the normative data provided by Sica et al. (2011), who standardized the 
questionnaire on a sample of 1454 youths in a range between 14 and 19 years of age 
(normative data are provided for different age groups as relevant). Cronbach’s α ≥ .80 for each 
scale in the present screening sample confirmed good to excellent reliability of the 
questionnaire. As the anxiety and the depression scales were very strongly correlated, r(168) = 
.76, p < .001, it was not possible to distinguish between different profiles of “internalizing” 
individuals (e.g. between “purely anxious” vs. “purely depressed”), and a combined scale was 
used in the present study (a convenience that has also been confirmed by the authors of the 
questionnaire). The items composing the anxiety and the depression scales of the Q-Pad are 
reported in Appendix B. 
Pictorial stimuli and procedure 
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All pictorial stimuli that were used during the encoding and the recognition phases, as 
well as the procedure, were the same as in Experiment 1. The only procedural differences were 
that all participants were required to complete distracting filler tasks during the 15 minutes 
retention interval (i.e. there was no “post-encoding elaboration” condition), and that they were 
tested in a quiet room within their own school (instead of in a laboratory setting). 
 
3.2.2  Results 
 
As in Experiment 1, causal errors, gap-filling errors, and hits were analysed. As they 
were treated as repeated measurements of a binomial response, a logistic mixed-effects model 
approach was used (Jaeger, 2008). Again, fixed effects were Group, Valence, and their 
interaction, while random effects were Participants and Photographs. AIC (Akaike, 1974) was 
also reported, and evidence ratio based on the Akaike weights (Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004) 
was used to quantify the evidence in favour of each fixed effect (see Experiment 1). 
 
Causal errors 
For causal errors, a significant main effect of Group was found, χ2(1) = 20.60, p < .001 
(model with Group: AIC = 550.65; model without Group: AIC = 569.25; evidence ratio = 
10938.02). No significant main effect of Valence was found, χ2(1) = .62, p = .43 (model with 
Valence: AIC = 550.65; model without Valence: AIC = 549.27; evidence ratio = 0.50). 
Crucially, a significant Group x Valence interaction was found on causal errors, with strong 
evidence, χ2(1) = 12.58, p < .001 (model with the interaction: AIC = 540.08; model without the 
interaction: AIC = 550.65; evidence ratio = 197.35); the interaction seems to qualify the main 
effect of Group; indeed, as it can be seen in Figure 3.1, the two groups diverge in the 
probability of committing false memory in the negative rather than in the neutral condition. 
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Both random effects were significant: for Participants, χ2(1) = 3.86, p = .04 (full model: AIC = 
540.08; model without Participants: AIC = 541.93); for Photographs, χ2(1) = 50.65, p < .001 
(model without Photographs: AIC = 588.72). The estimated probabilities of producing causal 
errors in the two groups and in the two conditions of valence are reported in Figure 3.1. See 
Table 3.1 for detailed information on the model, including estimated parameters and odds 
ratios. 
 
Figure 3.1. Estimated probability of causal error by Group and Valence for Experiment 2. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Gap-filling errors 
For gap-filling errors, no significant effect of Group was found, χ2(1) = 1.30, p = .25 
(model with Group: AIC = 1222.0; model without Group: AIC = 1221.3; evidence ratio = 
0.70). No significant main effect of Valence was found either, χ2(1) < .001, p = .98 (model with 
Valence: AIC = 1221.98; model without Valence: AIC = 1219.98; evidence ratio = 0.37). No 
significant Group x Valence interaction emerged, although there was a tendency accompanied 
by a very weak degree of evidence, χ2(1) = 3.08, p = .08 (model with the interaction: AIC = 
1220.89; model without the interaction: AIC = 1221.98; evidence ratio = 1.73). Both random 
effects were significant: for Participants, χ2(1) = 64.18, p < .001 (full model: AIC = 1220.89; 
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model without Participants: AIC = 1283.08); for Photographs, χ2(1) = 157.64, p < .001 (model 
without Photographs: AIC = 1376.53). The estimated probabilities of producing gap-filling 
errors in the two groups and in the two conditions of valence are reported in Figure 3.2. See 
Table 3.1 for detailed information on the model. 
 
Figure 3.2. Estimated probability of Gap-filling Error by Group and Valence for Experiment 2. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Accuracy 
For hits no significant fixed effects were found. For Group, χ2(1) = .17, p = .68 (model 
with Group: AIC = 1719.61; model without Group: AIC = 1717.78; evidence ratio = 0.40). For 
Valence, χ2(1) = .03, p = .86 (model with Valence: AIC = 1719.61; model without Valence: 
AIC = 1717.64; evidence ratio = 0.37). Finally, no significant Group x Valence interaction 
emerged, χ2(1) = .68, p = .41 (model with the interaction: AIC = 1720.92; model without the 
interaction: AIC = 1719.61; evidence ratio = 0.74). As no fixed effects emerged, significance 
of random effects are not reported. The estimated probabilities of hits in the two groups and in 
the two conditions of valence are however shown in Figure 3.3. Detailed information on the 
models is reported in Table 3.1. 
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Figure 3.3. Estimated accuracy (i.e. estimated probability of hit) by Group and Valence for 
Experiment 2. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 3.1. Fixed effects of Group, Valence, and Group x Valence on causal errors, gap-filling 
errors and hits, in Experiment 2, using logistic mixed-effects models. 
Fixed effect B SE Odds ratio χ2(df) 
Dependent variable: Causal errors 
    
Group 
   
20.60*** (1) 
      Internalizing 1.26 .27 3.51*** 
 
Valence 
   
.62 (1) 
      Negative -.17 .22 .84 
 
Group x Valence 
   
12.58*** (1) 
      Internalizing x Negative 1.62 .46 5.05*** 
 
Dependent variable: Gap-filling errors 
    
Group 
   
1.30 (1) 
      Internalizing .34 .29 1.41 
 
Valence 
   
< .01 (1) 
      Negative < .01 .15 1.00 
 
Group x Valence 
   
3.08 (1) 
      Internalizing x Negative -.56 .31 .57 
 
Dependent variable: Hits 
    
Group 
   
.17 (1) 
      Internalizing .09 .21 1.09 
 
Valence 
   
.03 (1) 
      Negative .02 .13 1.02 
 
Group x Valence 
   
.68 (1) 
      Internalizing x Negative .21 .25 1.24 
 
Note. Baseline category for Group was "control group", baseline category for Valence was 
“neutral”. Random effects were Participants and Photographs. Number of observations was 
480 for causal errors, 1440 for gap-filling errors, and 1920 for hits. Number of photographs 
was 8 for causal errors, 48 for gap-filling errors, and 56 for hits. Number of participants = 60. 
***p < .001. 
  
  
47 
 
3.2.3  Discussion 
 
Experiment 2 was designed to investigate how a strong presence of internalizing 
symptoms affects the production of false memories for emotional vs. neutral events. Results 
showed that individuals with strong internalizing symptoms and control participants have 
different patterns in the probability of committing inferential false memories as a function of 
the emotionality of encoded material. As hypothesized, while false memories were less likely 
for emotional than neutral material in control participants, the opposite happened in 
participants with strong internalizing symptoms. It is important to note that this pattern was 
specific to causal errors, i.e. to the aspects that represent the proximal causes of the viewed 
(emotional vs. neutral) effects, and that are most crucial to understand the specific happenings. 
On the contrary, no relevant differences between the two groups emerged in the case of gap-
filling errors and hits, indicating that these aspects are little or no affected by emotionality of 
the outcome embedded in the script; this also suggests that the strong presence of internalizing 
symptoms at the sub-clinical level does not entail general impairments in memory functioning 
(i.e., with the major exception of causal errors, the performance was similar across the two 
groups). 
The main result is consistent with previous literature, and extends it in important ways. 
With regard to control participants, the lower probability of committing negative false memory 
compared to the probability of committing neutral false memory replicates and strengthens 
evidence obtained in Experiment 1, and is consistent with the general notion that emotional 
material, in basic conditions, reduces the occurrence of memory distortions and false memories 
(Kensinger, 2007; Kensinger & Schacter, 2008). Most important, the fact that this protective 
effects was reversed in individuals with strong internalizing symptoms is consistent with 
previously reported mood-congruent false memory bias observed in individuals with emotional 
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disorders, specifically in the case of depression (e.g., Howe & Malone, 2011; Joormann et al., 
2009; Yeh & Hua, 2009). The present study also points to new important implications. First, 
the encoded material consisted of series of photographs representing everyday events, instead 
of word lists as in the DRM procedure; this allowed to investigate a conceptually different type 
of false memory, namely inferential memory errors (Hannigan & Reinitz, 2001). Second, 
unlike the critical lures in the DRM paradigm, the critical items that were used to test false 
memories in this experiment (i.e., photographs representing either gap-filling or the causal 
antecedents of specific outcomes) were not emotional themselves. These two points suggest 
that the mechanisms involved in false memory production in the present case are different from 
those described in previous studies that used the DRM procedure (e.g. Howe & Malone, 2011). 
Specifically, the increase in emotional causal errors observed in the internalizing group could 
not be attributed to the enhanced baseline activation of negatively charged material; rather, it 
may involve active reconstructive processes that focus on specific categories of events, namely 
negative events in the case of internalizing participants. This suggestion is consistent with the 
evidence that individuals with symptoms of depression have difficulties diverting attention 
away from negative information, and tend to over-elaborate it (Joormann, 2010; Joormann & 
Gotlib, 2008). According to this interpretation, a similar mechanism would have been at play in 
both Experiment 1 and 2, i.e. increased reconstructive processes fuelling inferential memory 
errors (these processes were clearly explicit in Experiment 1, but could have been implicit in 
Experiment 2). Another important point that emerged in the present study is that this emotional 
false memory bias could be observed at the sub-clinical level; this is consistent with findings of 
biased cognitive processing of emotional material in individuals suffering from symptoms of 
depression, and may suggest that these biases are trait markers of emotional disorders (e.g. 
Joormann, 2010; Krompinger & Simons, 2009; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). 
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Despite the evidence offered by Experiment 2, a series of questions remain open. First, it 
is not clear what the specific contributions of anxiety vs. depression symptoms are. The very 
strong correlation between the two aspects did not allow to properly address the point in the 
present study; this was not surprising, as it is well know that depression and anxiety are 
frequently in comorbidity in clinical cases (Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 1998) and strongly 
correlate in the general population (Mitte, 2008). Previous literature would suggest that 
depression plays a major role (e.g. Howe & Malone, 2011; Joormann et al., 2009) and that the 
effect of anxiety on false memory is questionable (Wenzel et al., 2004). However, the evidence 
is not conclusive and more research is needed. A second question that remains open is whether 
emotional material associated with positive valence would also affect the propensity of 
committing false memories in individuals with internalizing symptoms. These two questions 
were the focus of Experiment 3. 
 
 
3.3 Experiment 3: The role of trait anxiety3 
 
Experiment 3 was aimed to extend the evidence offered by Experiment 2. The most 
important point that I addressed was the specific role of anxiety. As I reviewed before, 
previous studies brought evidence that depression enhances false memory for negative material 
(e.g. Joormann et al., 2009), leaving unclear whether the same was true also in the case of 
anxiety. To my knowledge, only one study addressed the point, and failed to find a false 
memory bias (Wenzel et al., 2004); however, as I explained before, the experiment conducted 
by Wenzel and colleagues (2004) had particular characteristics that may have limited their 
conclusions, particularly the fact that they used specific feared objects as the critical lures to 
                                                          
3
 Results reported in Experiment 3 have been partially described in the following article: Toffalini, E., Mirandola, 
C., Coli, T., & Cornoldi, C. (2015). High trait anxiety increases inferential false memories for negative (but not 
positive) emotional events. Personality and Individual Differences, 75, 201–204. 
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investigate emotional false memories in phobic individuals, perhaps causing a “distinctiveness 
heuristic” (Dodson & Schacter, 2002). Therefore it is possible that, when an emotional context 
(instead of a specific and distinctive lure) is used, false memories are boosted also in anxious 
individuals, due to their over-elaboration of negative information, and consistently with the 
evidence of a general memory bias for negatively arousing (i.e. threat-relevant) information 
(see Mitte, 2008). 
The second point that I addressed in Experiment 3 concerned the effect of emotional 
material associated to positive valence. Previously reviewed studies on false memory in 
emotional disorders seem to indicate that positive material does not lead to enhanced false 
memory, but the evidence is mixed (see Moritz et al., 2005); furthermore, it is known that the 
cognitive processing of both negative and positive material is abnormal in emotional disorders 
(e.g. Mathews & McLeod, 2005). In brief, understanding whether a potential anxiety-related 
false memory bias is limited to negative material or it extends to all emotionally arousing 
information, may provide a useful insight into how anxiety affects the elaboration of emotional 
information. 
Through a larger screening on a youth population, in Experiment 3 I managed to create 
and test a group of participants who had strong symptoms of anxiety but average or low 
presence of depressive symptoms. Furthermore, I created a whole new set of scripted episodes 
to be used as the encoding material, in order to include a positively arousing outcome in each 
episode (besides the negative and the neutral ones). For the rest, the experimental design and 
the hypotheses were the same as in Experiment 2. 
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3.3.1  Method 
 
Participants 
As in Experiment 2, participants were selected through a wide screening using the Q-Pad 
questionnaire (Sica et al., 2011). A total of 321 youths were screened, including 5
th
 grade high 
school students and undergraduate students attending their first year of university (age ranged 
between 17 and 21 years). To shorten the screening process, only the anxiety, depression, and 
self-esteem/well-being scales of the Q-Pad were used (the latter was included only to balance a 
questionnaire that would otherwise have been composed exclusively by items expressing 
malaise). Based on the scores at the Q-Pad scales, two groups were formed. The “anxious 
group” was composed of participants (N = 34, mean age = 19.34, SD = 2.00, 22 females) 
whose score at the anxiety scale exceeded the 80
th
 percentile, but whose score at the depression 
scale was below the 60
th
 percentile. The control group was composed of an equal number of 
participants (N = 34, mean age =19.39, SD = 1.99, 17 females) whose scores at both the 
anxiety and the depression scales were below the 60
th
 percentile. Cronbach’s α was .87 for the 
anxiety scale and .85 for the depression scale in the screening sample, indicating very good 
reliability for both scales. As in Experiment 2, the two scales were strongly correlated, r(321) = 
.65, p < .001, but this time the larger sample size allowed to identify a sufficiently large group 
of individuals whose profile was specifically “anxious” (i.e. the “anxious group”). 
Consent, both written and oral, was obtained from all participants prior to the study. For 
all individuals under 18 years of age, written parental permission was obtained. 
 
Materials and procedure 
The experimental material and the procedure strictly followed those used in Experiment 
2, the only difference being that the outcomes of the scripts included a positive condition of 
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valence alongside a negative and a neutral one. To this purpose a new set of scripts, similar to 
those used for Experiment 1 and 2, were created, the details of which are described below.  
Pictorial stimuli for encoding 
Encoding stimuli consisted of a series of colour photographs representing 9 everyday 
episodes or scripts. A total of 21 photographs were created for each script. Out of them, 11 
were shown during the encoding phase as targets, and represented the body of the script, while 
other 3 photographs, similar to previous ones, were used as script consistent distractors to 
examine gap-filling errors; target and script consistent distractors were counterbalanced across 
participants, just as in Experiments 1 and 2. Furthermore, 7 photographs were created for each 
script to depict cause-effect patterns. Out of them, one photograph depicts the single, common 
antecedent for each of three similar but mutually exclusive outcomes which vary in 
emotionality: one outcome is negatively arousing, one outcome is positively arousing, and the 
remaining is neutral. Each of the three alternative outcomes is depicted by 2 photographs. 
Emotionality of the presented outcomes was counterbalanced across participants, such as each 
of the three alternative outcomes was presented to one third of the participants, and each 
participants encoded 3 negative, 3 positive, and 3 neutral outcomes overall (for a total of 9). 
All scripts were shown sequentially without interruptions, just as in Experiments 1 and 2 and in 
previous studies (e.g. Lyons et al., 2010). Actors and settings differed across all 9 scripts to 
make them easy to distinguish. Furthermore, as in the previous two experiments, 5 script-
inconsistent photographs were shown at the beginning of the encoding sequence, and 5 at the 
very end, to avoid primacy and recency effects. The encoding phase thus consisted of a total of 
127 photographs. 
Assessment of emotionality of the pictorial stimuli for encoding 
Just as for the previous version of the false memory paradigm (i.e. that used in 
Experiments 1 and 2), a pilot study was conducted to establish whether the photographs 
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representing the outcomes (i.e. 9 neutral vs. 9 positive vs. 9 negative outcomes) were actually 
different in terms of valence and arousal as they were intended to be. Twenty-one 
undergraduate students (who did not subsequently participated in the main experiment) rated 
each of the 27 outcomes in terms of their valence and arousal using the 9-point scales of the 
SAM (Bradley & Lang, 1994), just as it was done in the assessment of the pictorial material for 
Experiment 1; the procedure was exactly the same. 
Means, standard deviations, and 95% confidence intervals of the means (based on the t 
distribution) for the ratings of valence and arousal of the outcomes were as follows: 
 Valence of neutral outcomes: M = 5.31, SD = 1.35, 95% CI [5.11, 5.50]; 
 Valence of positive outcomes: M = 7.41, SD = 1.36, 95% CI [7.22, 7.61]; 
 Valence of negative outcomes: M = 2.57, SD = 1.43, 95% CI [2.36, 2.77]; 
 Arousal of neutral outcomes: M = 2.21, SD = 1.67, 95% CI [1.83, 2.31]; 
 Arousal of positive outcomes: M = 4.12, SD = 2.51, 95% CI [3.76, 4.48]; 
 Arousal of negative outcomes: M = 5.34, SD = 2.32, 95% CI [5.01, 5.67]. 
The differences between neutral, positive, and negative outcomes were thus in general 
large in terms of both valence and arousal: 
 Valence: neutral vs. positive, Cohen’s d = 1.56;  
 Valence: neutral vs. negative, Cohen’s d = 1.97;  
 Valence: positive vs. negative, Cohen’s d = 3.47;  
 Arousal: neutral vs. positive, Cohen’s d = .96;  
 Arousal: neutral vs. negative, Cohen’s d = 1.62;  
 Arousal: positive vs. negative, Cohen’s d = .51.  
Therefore, while the ratings confirmed that the outcomes are in general really appropriate 
as for their emotionality, it also appeared that the positive and negative outcomes are not in fact 
equal in terms of arousal. Indeed, although both categories of outcomes are largely more 
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arousing than the neutral outcomes, it was also found that negative outcomes are more arousing 
than positive ones, with an effect size that could be defined as medium (Cohen, 1988). 
Pictorial stimuli for recognition 
A sequence of 90 photographs in a randomized order was presented at the recognition 
test. As in the previous two experiments, 4 target photographs, 3 script-consistent distractors 
and, crucially, the photograph depicting the cause whose outcome had been shown during the 
encoding phase, were tested for each episode. The remaining 18 photographs were script-
inconsistent, of which half were actually presented during the encoding phase. 
 
3.3.2  Results 
 
Data analysis was conducted with the same logic as in Experiments 1 and 2. Causal 
errors, gap-filling errors and hits were treated as repeated measurements of binomial responses, 
and were analysed using logistic mixed-effects models (Jaeger, 2008). Significance of fixed 
effects of Group, Valence, and their interaction were assessed through likelihood ratio tests for 
nested models (Pinheiro & Bates, 2000), and evidence ratio was reported to quantify the 
evidence in favour of each fixed effect (Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004), as in the previous two 
experiments. Participants and Photographs were again inserted in all models as random effects. 
A preliminary analysis on the raw scores at the Q-Pad scales showed that, despite the 
careful selection made on the basis of the percentiles, the two groups still differed in terms of 
the depression scores; for the control group: M = 10.32, SD = 2.01; for the anxious group: M = 
11.91, SD = 2.12; t(66) = -3.17, p = .002. Depression and anxiety scores indeed positively 
correlated both within the control group (r = .49, p < .001) and within the anxious group (r = 
.32, p = .07). Nonetheless, both groups were considerably below the available norms for the Q-
Pad depression scale (M = 14.30, SD = 4.9). However, to avoid any risk of a confounding 
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effect of depression, the depression score (and its interaction with valence of material, were 
relevant) was included in all models as a control variable; the pattern of results were nearly 
identical. 
 
Causal errors 
As for causal errors, no significant main effect of Group was found, χ2(1) = 1.86, p = .17 
(model with Group: AIC = 796.58; model without Group: AIC = 796.44; evidence ratio = 
0.93). No significant main effect of Valence was found either, χ2(2) = .39, p = .82 (model with 
Valence: AIC = 796.58; model without Valence: AIC = 792.97; evidence ratio = 0.16). 
Importantly, a significant Group x Valence interaction was found, supported by strong 
evidence, χ2(2) = 19.65, p < .001 (model with interaction: AIC = 780.93; model without 
interaction: AIC = 796.58; evidence ratio = 2502.39). Both random effects were significant: for 
Participants, χ2(1) = 20.50, p < .001 (full model: AIC = 780.93; model without Participants: 
AIC = 799.43); for Photographs, χ2(1) = 31.45, p < .001 (model without Photographs: AIC = 
810.37). The estimated probabilities of producing causal errors in the two groups and in the 
three conditions of valence are displayed in Figure 3.4. Detailed information on the models, 
including estimated parameters and odds ratios, is reported in Table 3.2.  
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Figure 3.4. Estimated probability of causal error by Group and Valence for Experiment 3. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Gap-filling errors 
For gap-filling errors, no significant effect of Group was found, χ2(1) = .80, p = .37 
(model with Group: AIC = 1959.88; model without Group: AIC = 1958.68; evidence ratio = 
0.55). However, a significant main effect of Valence was found, χ2(2) = 7.76, p = .02 (model 
with Valence: AIC = 1959.88; model without Valence: AIC = 1963.64; evidence ratio = 6.55); 
analysis of the parameters (see Table 3.2) and observation of the estimated probabilities (see 
Figure 3.5) indicate that this is due to gap-filling errors being less likely in the positive than in 
the negative condition, but this main effect seems to be fully qualified by a Group x Valence 
interaction. Indeed, a significant Group x Valence interaction was found, supported by a good 
degree of evidence, χ2(2) = 9.64, p = .008 (model with the interaction: AIC = 1954.24; model 
without the interaction: AIC = 1959.88; evidence ratio = 16.78); as it can be seen in Figure 3.5, 
this is due to anxious participants committing fewer gap-filling errors than control participants 
in the positive condition, while the two groups do not seem to differ in the other two conditions 
. Both random effects were significant: for Participants, χ2(1) = 173.47, p < .001 (full model: 
AIC = 1954.24; model without Participants: AIC = 2125.71); for Photographs, χ2(1) = 41.79, p 
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< .001 (model without Photographs: AIC = 1994.03). The estimated probabilities of producing 
gap-filling errors in the two groups and in the three conditions of valence are reported in Figure 
3.5. Detailed information on the models is reported in Table 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.5. Estimated probability of Gap-filling Error by Group and Valence for Experiment 3. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Accuracy 
For hits no significant fixed effects were found. For Group, χ2(1) = .22, p = .64 (model 
with Group: AIC = 2630.65; model without Group: AIC = 2628.87; evidence ratio = 0.41). For 
Valence, χ2(2) = 1.44, p = .49 (model with Valence: AIC = 2630.65; model without Valence: 
AIC = 2628.09; evidence ratio = 0.28). Finally, no significant Group x Valence interaction 
emerged, χ2(1) = .43, p = .81 (model with the interaction: AIC = 2634.22; model without the 
interaction: AIC = 2630.65; evidence ratio = 0.17). As no fixed effects emerged, significance 
of random effects are not reported. Nonetheless, the estimated probabilities of hits in the two 
groups and in the three conditions of valence are displayed in Figure 3.6. Detailed information 
on the models is reported in Table 3.2. 
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Figure 3.6. Estimated accuracy (i.e. estimated probability of hit) by Group and Valence for 
Experiment 3. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
  
  
59 
 
Table 3.2. Fixed effects of Group, Valence, and Group x Valence on causal errors, gap-filling 
errors and hits, in Experiment 3, using logistic mixed-effects models. 
Fixed effect B SE Odds ratio χ2(df) 
Dependent variable: Causal errors 
    
Group 
   
1.86 (1) 
      Anxious .35 .26 1.42 
 
Valence 
   
.39 (2) 
      Positive -.06 .22 .94 
 
      Negative .07 .22 1.07 
 
Group x Valence 
   
19.65*** (2) 
      Anxious x Positive .53 .44 1.71 
 
      Anxious x Negative 1.94 .46 6.99*** 
 
Dependent variable: Gap-filling errors 
    
Group 
   
.80 (1) 
      Anxious -.25 .28 .78 
 
Valence 
   
7.76* (2) 
      Positive -.22 .14 .80 
 
      Negative .18 .14 1.20 
 
Group x Valence 
   
9.64** (2) 
      Anxious x Positive -.44 .29 .65 
 
      Anxious x Negative .46 .28 1.59 
 
Dependent variable: Hits 
    
Group 
   
.22 (1) 
      Anxious -.14 .29 .87 
 
Valence 
   
1.44 (2) 
      Positive -.11 .12 .90 
 
      Negative -.14 .12 .87 
 
Group x Valence 
   
.43 (2) 
      Anxious x Positive -.12 .25 .89 
 
      Anxious x Negative .04 .25 1.04 
 
Note. Baseline category for Group was "control group", baseline category for Valence was 
“neutral”. Random effects were Participants and Photographs. Number of observations was 
612 for causal errors, 1836 for gap-filling errors, and 2448 for hits. Number of photographs 
was 9 for causal errors, 54 for gap-filling errors, and 63 for hits. Number of participants = 68. 
*p < .05, **p < .01 ***p < .001. 
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3.3.3  Discussion 
 
In Experiment 3 the effect of high trait anxiety on the production of inferential false 
memories was examined. A key goal of Experiment 3 was to disentangle the effect of anxiety 
from the effect of depression, which was a question left open after Experiment 2. In fact, in the 
present study the anxious group still had higher depression scores than the control group; 
however, both groups were well below the mean score of the Q-Pad depression scale for the 
general youth population as reported by Sica et al. (2011); furthermore, the effect of anxiety 
was found even after controlling for the depression scores in the analysis. Having chosen a 
group of participants who have high trait anxiety but who are around or below the median in 
terms of their depression levels provides important information. Indeed, it has been suggested 
that, when anxiety and depression symptoms co-occurs (which is common, see for example 
Mineka et al., 1998), peculiar memory biases for emotional material can be found, which are 
different from those found in “pure” anxiety or depression (e.g. Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Tarsia, 
Power, & Sanavio, 2003). Previously published studies on false memory bias for emotional 
material in depression did not systematically control this aspect; indeed, only Howe and 
Malone (2011) excluded participants who had comorbid anxiety, while other studies (e.g. 
Joormann et al., 2009; Moritz et al., 2005; Yeh & Hua, 2009) either do not provide information 
on this point or do not exclude comorbidity. 
This is, to my knowledge, the first study that reports a specific anxiety-related false 
memory bias for emotional information. The main result was that anxious individuals made 
more causal errors for negative – but not positive or neutral – events than control participants. 
This supports and extends previous findings showing that individuals who suffer from 
emotional disorders such as depression (see previously reviewed studies) and strong 
internalizing traits at the sub-clinical level (see Experiment 2) may be highly likely to commit 
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false memories for emotional information. The fact that a memory bias was found in the case 
of anxiety at the sub-clinical level is consistent with previous research (Mitte, 2008)  
Importantly, the negative events that I showed as part of the encoding material were also 
arousing. In previous research on false memory biases in depression, either negative but non-
arousing verbal material was used (e.g., Joormann et al., 2009) or the distinction between 
valence and arousal was not explicitly considered (Yeh & Hua, 2009; although reading their 
DRM word lists suggest that negative material was also more arousing than neutral one; e.g. 
“destruction”, “violence”, and “sufferance” were among their negative critical lures). Negative 
arousing material is usually threat-relevant, and it is the type of information that anxious 
individuals are quicker at detecting and elaborating (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Mitte, 2008). 
Therefore, the emotional material that I used could be especially suitable for research on 
memory and anxiety. Anxious individuals are known to be more likely to focus on, elaborate, 
and make inferences about threatening events compared to non-anxious individuals; this could 
provide a straightforward explanation of why anxious participants were found highly likely to 
commit inferential false memories for negative arousing events. 
Two other results are worth mentioning. First, anxious participants were less likely than 
control participants to incur gap-filling errors within the episodes associated to positive 
outcomes. This had not been hypothesized, but is consistent with the idea that anxious 
participants focused on and elaborated in an extensive way the events that contained threat-
related information (i.e. only the negative arousing events), possibly diverting their attention 
away from threat-inconsistent information (i.e. mainly from the positive events). Second, the 
fact that control participants were less likely to incur causal errors for negative than for neutral 
material replicates and strengthens the evidence obtained in Experiments 1 and 2, and is 
consistent with the hypothesis that, in basic conditions, emotional material protects against 
memory distortions (Kensinger & Schacter, 2008). Finally, with regard to the probability of 
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committing causal errors for positive events, it also seems to be lower than the probability of 
committing causal errors for neutral events, which is consistent with the finding that positive 
emotional material also protects against false memories (e.g. Palmer & Dodson, 2009); 
however, in this case the evidence is weak (as it can be seen in Figure 3.4, the estimated 
probability of committing causal errors in the positive condition is included in the 95% 
confidence interval of the estimated probability of committing causal errors in the neutral 
condition), and thus it needs further replication, possibly with a larger sample size. 
A series of questions remain open, and should be addressed by future research. First, the 
present pattern of results was obtained in a group of young adults, but extending the evidence 
through the entire range of adult age would be important. Second, the effect of anxiety could be 
explored on its continuum; indeed, in both Experiments 2 and 3 the focus was on the 
comparisons between extreme groups, and this was done to simplify research and seek for a 
clear pattern of results. However, a future experiment could try to test whether, for example, 
the effects of anxiety or internalizing traits on the production of false memories is linear and 
progressive, or if it is a threshold-like function. Finally, a comparison between the effects of 
high vs. low arousal events could be made; indeed, as I suggested before, it is possible that 
only high arousing negative events lead anxious participants to an increase in false memories. 
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4. WORKING MEMORY AND THE OCCURRENCE OF INFERENTIAL FALSE 
MEMORIES FOR EMOTIONAL EVENTS 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
The previous chapter offered evidence that individual differences, particularly with 
regard to the level of internalizing traits, affect the occurrence of false memories for emotional 
events. It seems reasonable that also individual differences in cognitive abilities may have an 
impact. In this respect, working memory (WM) capacity could be of special importance, due to 
its involvement in the ability to memorize and elaborate stimuli while concurrently rejecting 
interfering information (De Beni, Palladino, Pazzaglia, & Cornoldi, 1998; Engle, 2002). In this 
chapter I describe two experiments investigating how WM capacity affect the production of 
inferential false memories for emotional and neutral events, but first I briefly review the 
existing literature on the interplay between WM and false memory. 
WM has been defined as a multi-component, limited-capacity memory system that 
enables us to temporarily store and manipulate information (Baddeley, 2000, 2012). WM has 
been shown to serve a series of higher mental functions and to be strictly related to intelligence 
(e.g. Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999). Importantly, it has critical implications also 
for episodic memory. In particular, WM is involved in the binding of different features and 
parts of presented stimuli, which allows us to create complex representations and to store them 
in memory without errors (Allen, Baddeley, & Hitch, 2006; Reinitz & Hannigan, 2004). In 
particular, Reinitz and Hannigan (2004) showed that WM processing is needed in order to 
avoid false memories deriving from the recombination of studied elements. 
In the last decade, a number of studies have shown that individual differences in WM 
capacity are related to individual differences in the propensity to incur false memories. In 
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particular, it has been found that high WM capacity predicts a reduced occurrence of false 
memories for the critical lures using the DRM procedure (Bixter & Daniel, 2013; Peters, 
Jelicic, Verbeek, & Merckelbach, 2007; Watson, Bunting, Poole, & Conway, 2005). Bixter and 
Daniel (2013) hypothesized that good WM capacity may allow to effectively encode 
information while at the same time using strategies to avoid false memories (for example 
identifying the critical element to subsequently reject it at recognition, i.e. the so-called 
identify-to-reject strategy; see Carneiro et al., 2012); consistently with this hypothesis, some 
studies have found that WM capacity actually predicts the occurrence of false memories only 
when participants are given specific warnings about the possibility of committing such memory 
errors (Bixter & Conway, 2013; Watson et al., 2005). However, other studies found that WM 
capacity has a significant protective effect against false memories even without providing any 
warning (e.g., Peters et al., 2007). 
A protective effect of WM capacity against false memory was found also using different 
paradigms. In particular, Jaschinski and Wentura (2002) reported that participants with higher 
WM capacity were better able at resisting misleading information provided after encoding; 
furthermore, Gerrie and Garry (2007) found that participants with higher WM capacity were 
less prone to falsely recognize elements related to crucial aspects of viewed events (while no 
effects were found in the case of non-crucial elements). One hypothesis is that persons with 
greater WM capacity are able to create and store a more detailed and coherent mental 
representation of the encoded material (Jaschinski & Wentura, 2002), which is consistent with 
the notion that WM serves the ability to bind together different features of an event without 
committing mistakes (Reinitz & Hannigan, 2004). Finally, testing a very large sample of 
participants with a misinformation paradigm, Zhu et al. (2010) recently found that, while 
different variables related to cognitive abilities (including fluid intelligence) negatively 
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predicted false memories occurrence, WM capacity had in fact the strongest effect; this 
confirms the convenience of focusing on WM in the present study. 
To my knowledge, all published studies on the relationship between WM capacity and 
false memory used non-emotional material. Therefore it is not yet clear how WM capacity may 
differently affect the production of false memories for neutral vs. emotionally-charged events. 
However, hypotheses can be made. 
The existing literature suggests that negative information may have impairing effects on 
WM performance (e.g. Kensinger, 2009). For example, it has been found that individuals are 
slower to respond to a WM task when material is negatively charged (Kensinger & Corkin, 
2003), and that negative distracting stimuli interfere with the activity in the brain areas (i.e. in 
the prefrontal cortex) that are responsible for the executive control of WM – thus ultimately 
having detrimental effects on WM performance (e.g. Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006); furthermore, 
Osaka, Yaoi, Minamoto, and Osaka (2013) recently reported that, compared to neutral and 
positive distracting stimuli, negative ones are more difficult to inhibit during a WM task. 
Impairing effects on WM were reported using both arousing (e.g. Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006) 
and non-arousing (e.g. Osaka et al., 2013) negative stimuli. 
If negative information has detrimental effects on WM performance, which in turn is 
crucial to accurately encode stimuli and ward off false memories (e.g. Peters et al., 2007; 
Reinitz & Hannigan, 2004), then we would expect negative material to give rise to more false 
memories. However, in most cases the opposite is found (e.g. Kensinger & Schacter, 2005, 
2006b, 2008). It could thus be hypothesised that negative material has a twofold effect on the 
occurrence of false memories; on the one hand, it may interfere with WM processing, thus 
potentially leading to increased false memories; on the other hand, it may facilitate a detailed 
and careful encoding of the material at hand, thus protecting against memory errors. Normally, 
the “protective” effect seems to prevail, but in certain cases the “adverse” effects may emerge – 
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for example when available WM capacity is reduced. This hypothesis has been explored in 
Experiments 4 and 5. 
 
 
4.2  Experiment 4: The role of individual differences in working memory capacity 
 
In Experiment 4, the relationship between WM capacity at the level of individual 
differences and the propensity to incur inferential false memories for negative, positive, and 
neutral events was investigated. A relatively large sample of over one hundred young adults 
was recruited; participants were subjected to the same false memory paradigm as in 
Experiment 3. However, in the present study no groups were created, and WM capacity of each 
participants was measured using an active WM task (i.e. the Categorization Working Memory 
Span task, adapted from De Beni et al., 1998) that employs verbal material. The WM task was 
intended to measure the central executive aspect of WM; the fact that it used verbal material 
was considered appropriate due to the narrative structure of the encoded scripted material, the 
comprehension of which may involve verbal processing. 
In line with the reasoning presented in the Introduction of this chapter, it was 
hypothesized that WM capacity could be related to the production of false memories, and that 
this relationship could be moderated by valence. In particular it was expected that, at medium 
or high levels of WM capacity, emotional events would be less likely to give rise to false 
memories (in keeping with the literature showing protective effects of emotional material), 
while at low levels of WM negative (but not positive) events would no longer be protected 
against false memories compared to neutral events. This was hypothesized because it is known 
that negative (and apparently not positive) material interfere with WM performance (e.g. Osaka 
et al., 2013), which in turn is required to avoid false memories (e.g. Peters et al., 2007); 
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therefore, in participants with low WM capacity, available WM resources may not be sufficient 
to counteract the adverse effect of negative material on false memories, which may thus 
become evident. 
As in the previous experiments, the effect of valence was expected to be primarily found 
on causal errors, due to the fact that they are more strictly related to the emotional (or non-
emotional) outcomes. Furthermore, WM capacity was expected to affect causal errors more 
than gap-filling errors; indeed, it has been shown that WM capacity predicts the occurrence of 
false memories only when they concern aspects that are crucial of a given event (Gerrie & 
Garry, 2007). Causal errors are considered to involve crucial aspects of an event (i.e. the 
antecedent of its specific outcome), while gap-filling errors are non-crucial (i.e. they concern 
aspects that are consistent with – but not essential for the comprehension of – the event in its 
entirety). 
 
4.2.1  Method 
 
Participants 
The sample consisted of 103 undergraduate students (mean age = 22.50 years, SD = 1.99, 
females = 83) who attended a psychology course and received course credit in return for their 
participation. As for all the experiments described in this thesis, no participant had ever 
participated in any experiment involving the same paradigm or similar versions of it. Both 
written and oral informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to the study. 
 
Materials and procedure 
The pictorial stimuli used for encoding and recognition, as well as the procedure, were 
exactly the same as in Experiment 3; all participants were tested in a quiet laboratory room. 
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After the completion of the memory paradigm, participants were administered a verbal WM 
task (which lasted about 20 minutes) and a short version of the Q-Pad questionnaire (Sica et al., 
2011), which included the anxiety, depression, and self-esteem/well-being scales. The presence 
of anxious and depressive symptoms was assessed since in the previous two experiments it was 
found that internalizing symptoms – at least when they are particularly pronounced –, are likely 
to affect emotional false memories. The Q-Pad was used for consistency with the previous 
experiments and because, as the authors (Sica et al., 2011) pointed out, some of the scales 
assessing aspects that are not specific to adolescence (as in the case of anxiety and depression), 
are appropriate also for young adults over 19 years of age. Reliability of both scales was good, 
with Cronbach’s α = .78 for anxiety and α = .89 for depression, confirming the validity of the 
measure in our sample. Item scores were added to obtain the scores for the two scales. 
Working Memory task 
The Categorization Working Memory Span (CWMS; Borella, Carretti, Cornoldi, & De 
Beni, 2007, adapted from De Beni et al., 1998) task was used to measure working memory 
capacity at the level of individual differences. This task consists of lists of unrelated words 
being presented on a computer screen one after the other. Lists are composed of five words 
each, and are organized in sequences. Participants are required to read aloud each word and to: 
1) remember the last word of each list (primary task); 2) press the space bar every time that a 
word indicating an animal appears on the screen (secondary task). At the end of each sequence 
of word lists, the final words had to be recalled in the correct order. The task became 
increasingly difficult as the number of lists within each sequence, and thus the number of final 
words to be remembered, increased from a span of 2 to a span of 6. Two sequences of the same 
length were presented for each span length, for a total of 10 sequences. An example of the 
stimuli used in the CWMS task is reported in Appendix C. 
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The primary index of working memory capacity was the number of final words 
remembered in the correct order, which consequently ranged between 0 and 40. The 
frequencies of omissions and false alarms at pressing the space bar when reading the name of 
an animal were also considered to make sure that participants were not neglecting the 
secondary task. As such frequencies were very low for both omissions and false alarms, and 
there was no evidence that any participant had neglected the secondary task, omissions and 
false alarms were not included in the subsequent analysis, and all working memory scores were 
considered as valid. 
The CWMS material was presented using E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, 
Inc., Pittsburgh, PA, USA). Words were presented on the computer screen for 1000 ms each, 
and were divided by a 500 ms blank screen as the interstimuli; lists were divided by a screen 
showing a square for 2000 ms; the end of each sequence – and thus the moment to recall the 
final words of each list – was signalled by a triple question mark, and was self-paced (i.e. it 
lasted until the participant had responded and the experimenter had subsequently pressed a 
key). Two sequences were administered as practice trials before the test. 
 
4.2.2  Results 
 
Data analysis was conducted in a way similar to that of the previous experiments: causal 
errors, gap-filling errors and hits were analysed using logistic mixed-effects models (Jaeger, 
2008), significance of the effects was assessed through likelihood ratio tests for nested models 
(Pinheiro & Bates, 2000), and evidence ratio was reported for fixed effects (Wagenmakers & 
Farrell, 2004). Participants and Photographs were treated as random effects. Anxiety and 
depression scale scores obtained using the Q-Pad questionnaire, as well as their interaction 
with Valence, were controlled for by including them as fixed effects in all models. Fixed 
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effects of WM capacity (which was treated as a continuous predictor), Valence, and their 
interaction, were tested. 
 
Causal errors 
For causal errors, no main effect of WM capacity was found, χ2(1) = .11, p = .74 (model with 
WM capacity: AIC = 1103.71; model without WM capacity: AIC = 1101.82; evidence ratio = 
0.39). A significant main effect of Valence was found, with very strong evidence, χ2(2) = 
21.98, p < .001 (model with Valence: AIC = 1101.57; model without Valence: AIC = 1119.56; 
evidence ratio = 8034.5); analysis of the parameters (see Table 4.1) confirmed that, in a normal 
population of young adults who encode material in basic conditions, both positive and negative 
events are less likely to lead to causal memory errors than neutral events. Crucially, a 
significant WM capacity x Valence interaction was found, with evidence that was positive 
although not strong, χ2(2) = 6.91, p = .03 (model with interaction: AIC = 1100.80; model 
without interaction: AIC = 1103.71; evidence ratio = 4.28); consideration of regression 
parameters (Table 4.1) and observation of probability slopes (Figure 4.1) seem to suggest that, 
while probability of committing causal errors for neutral and positive events is relatively 
unaffected by WM capacity, probability of committing causal errors for negative material is 
negatively predicted by WM capacity. Both random effects were significant: for Participants, 
χ2(1) = 49.71, p < .001 (full model: AIC = 1100.80; model without Participants: AIC = 
1148.51); for Photographs, χ2(1) = 67.92, p < .001 (model without Photographs: AIC = 
1166.72). The estimated probabilities of producing causal errors as a function of WM capacity 
in the three conditions of valence are shown in Figure 4.1. Detailed information on the models, 
including estimated parameters and odds ratios, is reported in Table 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1. Estimated probability of causal error as a function of WM capacity in the three 
condition of Valence for Experiment 4. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence bands. 
 
Gap-filling errors and accuracy 
No significant fixed effects were found for gap-filling errors. For WM capacity, χ2(1) = 
.03, p = .86 (model with WM capacity: AIC = 2227.81; model without WM capacity: AIC = 
2225.85; evidence ratio = 0.37). For Valence, χ2(2) = .47, p = .79 (model with Valence: AIC = 
2222.20; model without Valence: AIC = 2218.66; evidence ratio = 0.17). For the WM capacity 
x Valence interaction, χ2(2) = 3.10, p = .21 (model with interaction: AIC = 2228.71; model 
without interaction: AIC = 2227.81; evidence ratio = 0.64). As no significant fixed effects were 
found, significance of random effects was not calculated. Estimated probabilities of producing 
gap-filling errors as a function of WM capacity in the three conditions of valence (Figure 4.2), 
and details on statistical models (Table 4.1) have however been reported.  
Also for hits no significant fixed effects emerged. For WM capacity, χ2(1) = .15, p = .70 
(model with WM capacity: AIC = 2693.72; model without WM capacity: AIC = 2691.87; 
evidence ratio = 0.40). For Valence, χ2(2) = 1.23, p = .54 (model with Valence: AIC = 2688.96; 
model without Valence: AIC = 2686.20; evidence ratio = 0.25). For the WM capacity x 
Valence interaction, χ2(2) = .70, p = .71 (model with interaction: AIC = 2697.03; model 
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without interaction: AIC = 2693.72; evidence ratio = 0.19). As for gap-filling errors, 
significance of random effects was not calculated; estimated probabilities of hits as a function 
of WM capacity in the three conditions of valence (Figure 4.3), and details on statistical 
models (Table 4.1) have been reported. 
 
Figure 4.2. Estimated probability of Gap-filling Error as a function of WM capacity in the 
three condition of Valence for Experiment 4. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence bands. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Estimated accuracy (i.e. estimated probability of hits) as a function of WM 
capacity in the three condition of Valence for Experiment 4. Shaded areas represent 95% 
confidence bands. 
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Table 4.1. Fixed effects of WM capacity, Valence, and their interaction on causal errors, gap-
filling errors and hits, in Experiment 4, using logistic mixed-effects models. 
Fixed effect B SE Odds ratio χ2(df) 
Dependent variable: Causal errors 
    
WM capacity -.01 .02 .99 .11 (1) 
Valence 
   
21.98*** (2) 
      Positive -.90 .19 .41*** 
 
      Negative -.52 .19 .59** 
 
WM capacity x Valence 
   
6.91* (2) 
      WM capacity x Positive .03 .04 1.03 
 
      WM capacity x Negative -.07 .03 .93 
 
Dependent variable: Gap-filling errors 
    
WM capacity < .01 .02 1.00 .03 (1) 
Valence 
   
.47 (2) 
      Positive .05 .14 1.06 
 
      Negative .10 .14 1.10 
 
WM capacity x Valence 
   
3.10 (2) 
      WM capacity x Positive < .01 .03 1.00 
 
      WM capacity x Negative .04 .03 1.04 
 
Dependent variable: Hits 
    
WM capacity .01 .02 1.01 .15 (1) 
Valence 
   
1.23 (2) 
      Positive -.01 .12 .99 
 
      Negative .12 .12 1.13 
 
WM capacity x Valence 
   
.70 (2) 
      WM capacity x Positive -.01 .02 .99 
 
      WM capacity x Negative -.02 .02 .98 
 
Note. Baseline category for Valence was “neutral”. Random effects were Participants and 
Photographs. Number of observations was 927 for causal errors, 2781 for gap-filling errors, 
and 3708 for hits. Number of photographs was 9 for causal errors, 54 for gap-filling errors, and 
63 for hits. Number of participants = 103. *p < .05, **p < .01 ***p < .001. 
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4.2.3  Discussion 
 
The main result of Experiment 4 was that the effect of WM capacity on the production of 
inferential false memories varied as a function of the valence of encoded material. In particular, 
while for neutral and positively charged episodes the occurrence of causal errors did not seem 
to be affected by WM capacity, an inverse relationship between the two variables was observed 
for negatively charged episodes. This pattern of results is consistent with the hypothesis that 
WM resources are required to ward off false memories for negative events. Indeed, it was 
hypothesized that, while emotional material would normally protect against false memories 
(e.g. Kensinger & Schacter, 2005; Palmer & Dodson, 2009; but see also the previous three 
experiments in this dissertation), negative material would interfere with the ability to control 
WM (Osaka et al., 2013) which should lead to more false memories (e.g. Peters et al., 2007; 
Zhu et al., 2010) – and this adverse effect would become evident at lower baseline WM 
capacity. The results confirmed the hypothesis. Interestingly, the estimated probability of 
committing negative causal errors in participants with the lowest level of WM capacity was 
roughly equal to the estimated probability of committing neutral causal errors (see Figure 4.1); 
on the contrary, positive valence emerged to be always protected against causal errors, i.e. for 
any given level of WM capacity. 
Results from Experiment 4, however, have a series of limitation. First, the effect of WM 
capacity on the production of false memories is limited to the negative condition. While it is 
still disputed whether WM capacity at the level of individual differences affects false memory 
production at all (Bixter & Daniel, 2013; Watson, et al., 2005), most evidence indicates this is 
the case, although with modest effect size (e.g. Gerrie & Garry, 2007; Peters et al., 2007; Zhu 
et al., 2010). One could thus have expected WM capacity to have an inverse relationship with 
the occurrence of false memories across the board, and this relationship to be stronger for 
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negative than for positive or neutral material – but this was not found. Even the interaction 
between valence and WM capacity, albeit significant, was supported by a limited amount of 
evidence (the model with the interaction was only 4.28 more likely to be the best model 
compared to the model without the interaction). One possibility is that individual differences in 
WM capacity were too limited in range – because of the relative homogeneity of a sample of 
young undergraduate students – for an across-the-board effect to emerge. However, also 
previous studies (e.g. Zhu et al., 2010) tested undergraduate students. Furthermore, while it 
was expected that any effect involving valence (thus including the interaction between valence 
and WM capacity) would be primarily found on causal errors, WM capacity was not found to 
affect neither gap-filling errors nor hits at all. This may indicate that the memory paradigm 
consisting of the presentation of scripted everyday events – such as the paradigm that I used – 
does not involve WM processing to a large extent. To try to overcome these limitations, and to 
strengthen the evidence brought by Experiment 4, in the next experiment the effect of WM 
capacity was examined using an experimental manipulation. 
 
 
4.3  Experiment 5: The effect of induced reduction of available working memory 
capacity 
 
Experiment 5 aimed to extend the results emerged in Experiment 4 by examining the 
effect of an artificial, temporary reduction of available WM resources during the encoding 
phase. This condition was obtained by mean of a concurrent request (counting backwards by 
two). Indeed, it is known that performing a dual task reduces the available WM resources, and 
specifically that it affects the central executive component of WM (Baddeley, 2000; Baddeley, 
Allen, & Hitch, 2011). The concurrent task was of verbal nature for consistency with the 
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previous experiment, in which participants had their WM capacity assessed using an active task 
that was focused on the verbal component (De Beni et al., 1998). 
 
4.3.1  Method 
 
Participants 
A group of 77 undergraduate students took part in the experiment and received course 
credit in exchange for their participation. Participants were randomly assigned to either one of 
two conditions: WM-load condition (N = 39, mean age = 20.62 years, SD = 1.57, females = 29) 
or control condition (N = 38, mean age = 21.18 years, SD = 2.71, females = 29). Written and 
oral informed consent was obtain from all participants prior to the study. 
 
Materials and procedure 
For participants in the control condition, materials and procedure were exactly the same as in 
Experiment 4. Participants in the WM-load condition were administered the same materials 
and procedure, the only difference being that they were required to do a concurrent double task 
while encoding the pictorial stimuli. The concurrent task consisted of counting backward by 
two starting from 800 (such that participants had to say aloud, while viewing the photographs, 
“798, 796, 794, ...”); a manipulation that was intended to directly affect the central executive 
component of the WM system (Baddeley, 2000; Baddeley et al., 2011). Prior to the study it 
was conducted a pilot test on three participants (who were not subsequently included in the 
experiment) to evaluate whether the concurrent task would be sufficiently demanding given the 
present memory paradigm; it was found that counting backward by three was excessively 
demanding, as to make it nearly impossible to encode any narrative of the scripts, while 
counting backward by two seemed appropriate. 
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As in Experiment 4, all participants were administered the CWMS task (De Beni et al., 
1988) and the depression, anxiety, and self-esteem/well-being scales of the Q-Pad (Sica et al., 
2011) after the completion of the false memory paradigm. This was done to ensure that the two 
groups were actually comparable in terms of both baseline working memory capacity and 
presence of internalizing symptoms, as both these aspects were found to potentially affect 
production of inferential false memories for emotional events (see Experiments 2-4). 
 
4.3.2 Results 
 
Preliminary analysis showed that the two groups were indeed equivalent in terms of both 
baseline WM capacity and presence of internalizing symptoms at the level of individual 
differences. For CWMS scores, WM-load group: M = 31.36, SD = 6.30, 95% CI [29.38, 
33.34]; control group: M = 30.92, SD = 6.02, 95% CI [29.01, 32.83]. For anxiety scores, WM-
load group: M = 21.05, SD = 5.19, 95% CI [19.42, 22.68]; control group: M = 21.58, SD = 
4.84, 95% CI [20.04, 23.12]. For depression scores, WM-load group: M = 12.49, SD = 3.79, 
95% CI [11.30, 13.68]; control group: M = 12.76, SD = 3.82, 95% CI [11.55, 13.97]. 
Data analysis on causal errors, gap-filling errors and hits was conducted as in Experiment 
4, with the difference that participants were categorized by Group, which was used as the 
predictor instead of WM capacity. Logistic mixed-effects models were used (Jaeger, 2008), 
and significance of the effects was tested using likelihood ratio tests for nested models 
(Pinheiro & Bates, 2000); evidence ratio was reported for fixed effects (Wagenmakers & 
Farrell, 2004). Participants and Photographs were treated as random effects. As in Experiment 
4, scores on the anxiety and depression scales and their interaction with Valence were 
controlled for by including them as fixed effects in all models. 
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Causal errors 
A significant main effect of Group on the probability of committing causal errors was 
found, and evidence was very strong, χ2(1) = 15.33, p < .001 (model with Group: AIC = 
867.99; model without Group: AIC = 881.32; evidence ratio = 784.46); analysis of the 
parameters (Table 4.2) showed that the probability of committing causal errors was higher in 
the WM-load group and in the control group. A significant main effect of Valence was also 
found, with clear evidence, χ2(2) = 12.13, p = .002 (model with Valence: AIC = 864.77; model 
without Valence: AIC = 872.90; evidence ratio = 58.26); analysis of the parameters (Table 4.2) 
and observation of the estimated probabilities (Figure 4.4) indicated that this main effect was 
due to causal errors being less frequent for positive than for neutral scripts, and that this was 
qualified by a Group x Valence interaction. Indeed, a significant Group x Valence interaction 
emerged, with positive although not strong evidence, χ2(2) = 6.92, p = .03 (model with 
interaction: AIC = 865.07; model without interaction: AIC = 867.99; evidence ratio = 4.31); as 
it is shown in Figure 4.4, this implied that while both positive and negative events led to fewer 
causal errors compared to neutral events in the control group, only positive events led to fewer 
causal errors in the WM-load group.  Both random effects were significant: for Participants, 
χ2(1) = 11.57, p < .001 (full model: AIC = 865.07; model without Participants: AIC = 874.63); 
for Photographs, χ2(1) = 53.42, p < .001 (model without Photographs: AIC = 916.49). The 
estimated probabilities of producing causal errors in the two groups and in the three conditions 
of valence are displayed in Figure 4.4. Detailed information on the models, including estimated 
parameters and odds ratios, is reported in Table 4.2.  
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Figure 4.4. Estimated probability of causal error by Group and Valence for Experiment 5. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Gap-filling errors 
For gap-filling errors, Group had a significant main effect, and evidence was very strong, 
χ2(1) = 12.71, p < .001 (model with Group: AIC = 2040.51; model without Group: AIC = 
2051.23; evidence ratio = 212.72); analysis of the parameters (see Table 4.2) showed that 
participants in the WM-load group were more likely to commit gap-filling errors than 
participants in the control group.  No significant main effect of Valence was found, χ2(2) = 
1.55, p = .46 (model with Valence: AIC = 2033.46; model without Valence: AIC = 2031.00; 
evidence ratio = 0.29). Further, no significant Group x Valence interaction was found, χ2(2) = 
.24, p = .89 (model with the interaction: AIC = 2044.28; model without the interaction: AIC = 
2040.51; evidence ratio = 0.15). Both random effects were significant: for Participants, χ2(1) = 
102.52, p < .001 (full model: AIC = 2044.28; model without Participants: AIC = 2144.80); for 
Photographs, χ2(1) = 293.26, p < .001 (model without Photographs: AIC = 2335.53). The 
estimated probabilities of producing gap-filling errors in the two groups and in the three 
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conditions of valence are reported in Figure 4.5. Detailed information on the models is reported 
in Table 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.5. Estimated probability of Gap-filling Error by Group and Valence for Experiment 5. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Accuracy 
Also for hits, Group had a significant main effect, and evidence was extremely strong, 
χ2(1) = 31.60, p < .001 (model with Group: AIC = 2873.39; model without Group: AIC = 
2902.99; evidence ratio > 2*10
6
); analysis of parameters (Table 4.6) indicated that the 
frequency of hits was lower in participants in the WM-load groups than in participants in the 
control group. No significant main effect of Valence was found, χ2(2) = .35, p = .84 (model 
with Valence: AIC = 2870.86; model without Valence: AIC = 2867.21; evidence ratio = 0.16). 
Finally, although the Group x Valence interaction did not reach the conventional level for 
statistical significance, there was some degree of evidence in favour of it, χ2(2) = 5.03, p = .08 
(model with interaction: AIC = 2872.36; model without interaction: AIC = 2873.39; evidence 
ratio = 1.68); observation of the estimated probabilities seems to suggest that while in the 
control group hits are more frequent in the negative condition, the opposite happens in the 
WM-load group. Both random effects were significant: for Participants, χ2(1) = 52.46, p < .001 
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(full model: AIC = 2872.36; model without Participants: AIC = 2922.82); for Photographs, 
χ2(1) = 174.26, p < .001 (model without Photographs: AIC = 3044.62). The estimated 
probabilities of hits in the two groups and in the three conditions of valence are displayed in 
Figure 4.6. Detailed information on the models is reported in Table 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.6. Estimated accuracy (i.e. estimated probability of hit) by Group and Valence for 
Experiment 5. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 4.2. Fixed effects of Group, Valence, and Group x Valence on causal errors, gap-filling 
errors and hits, in Experiment 5, using logistic mixed-effects models. 
Fixed effect B SE Odds ratio χ2(df) 
Dependent variable: Causal errors 
    
Group 
   
15.33*** (1) 
      WM-load .91 .23 2.48*** 
 
Valence 
   
12.13** (2) 
      Positive -.71 .95 .49*** 
 
      Negative -.18 .94 .84 
 
Group x Valence 
   
6.92* (2) 
      WM-load x Positive .11 .42 1.12 
 
      WM-load x Negative 1.04 .43 2.83* 
 
Dependent variable: Gap-filling errors 
    
Group 
   
12.71*** (1) 
      WM-load .84 .23 2.31*** 
 
Valence 
   
1.55 (2) 
      Positive .18 .14 1.19 
 
      Negative .11 .14 1.12 
 
Group x Valence 
   
.24 (2) 
      WM-load x Positive .06 .29 1.06 
 
      WM-load x Negative -.08 .29 .92 
 
Dependent variable: Hits 
    
Group 
   
31.60*** (1) 
      WM-load -.97 .16 .38*** 
 
Valence 
   
.35 (2) 
      Positive -.06 .11 .94 
 
      Negative < .01 .12 1.00 
 
Group x Valence 
   
5.03 (2) 
      WM-load x Positive .06 .23 1.06 
 
      WM-load x Negative -.44 .24 .64 
 
Note. Baseline category for Group was "control group", baseline category for Valence was 
“neutral”. Random effects were Participants and Photographs. Number of observations was 
693 for causal errors, 2079 for gap-filling errors, and 2772 for hits. Number of photographs 
was 9 for causal errors, 54 for gap-filling errors, and 63 for hits. Number of participants = 77. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.  
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4.3.3  Discussion 
 
Results from Experiment 5 confirmed evidence for an interplay between valence and 
available WM resources on the production of false memories. However, there were also novel 
findings. Unlike in Experiment 4, in the present study a general increase in false memories as a 
consequence of low available WM capacity was also found; this may be due to the fact that the 
depletion of WM resources in a dual task condition is much more taxing than having low WM 
capacity at the level of individual differences, at least within the range of normality for young 
adults (as it was in Experiment 4). In fact, previous research showed that a comparable dual 
task condition reduced the propensity to incur associative false memories using the DRM 
procedure (Knott & Dewhurst, 2007; although the opposite was also found, see for example 
Dehon, 2006; Otgaar, Peters, & Howe, 2012); the authors hypothesized that divided attention 
induced by the dual task – i.e. generating random numbers – reduced semantic processing of 
the word lists, thus decreasing the activation of the critical lure and consequently the 
propensity to falsely recognize it. In other words, participants in the dual task condition may 
have been too distracted to grasp the core aspect of the lists (Knott & Dewhurst, 2007); 
however, this effect may heavily depend on the difficulty of the dual task, as Otgaar and 
colleagues (2012), using an apparently easier secondary task, found that adult participants were 
more likely to rely on the semantic core of the lists, thus incurring more DRM false memories. 
In fact, in the present paradigm memorizing the viewed material may have been not critically 
dependent on semantic processing, also because such material is graphic and depicts easily 
comprehensible everyday events. In this context, WM resources appeared to have been crucial 
to accurately store all aspects of the events without errors, rather than to create a complex 
representation of the material as a whole. Furthermore, our secondary task was likely less 
demanding than that used by Knott and Dewhurst (2007). To be noted, however, the general 
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effect of the WM-load condition on causal and gap-filling errors may not be due to a genuine 
increase in propensity to false memories, but rather to a general decrease in the ability to 
discriminate old-new photographs; indeed, also hits were affected by the dual task. 
Despite some questions remaining open, a crucial finding emerged, and it shows that 
reduced WM resources affects the production of negative causal errors more than the 
production of neutral or positive ones. This is consistent with results from Experiment 4, and 
confirms that good WM resources are a necessary condition for the protective effect of 
negative emotion against inferential false memories to be observed. The strength of the 
evidence was positive, although not large, just as in the previous experiment. Another 
important point that emerged in Experiment 5 was that the interplay between WM and valence 
seems to take place during the encoding phase. This was left unclear in the previous 
experiment, where participants with low WM capacity were obviously characterized by their 
condition in all phases of the memory process (i.e. encoding, consolidation, and retrieval). In 
Experiment 5, instead, participants in the WM-load condition could rely on their full WM 
resources during the retrieval phase, and yet negative material did not protect them against 
false memory. This is consistent with the notion that WM processing is critically involved in 
creating a solid complex representation of the events when they are first viewed, thus avoiding 
memory distortions (e.g. Gerrie & Garry, 2007; Reinitz & Hannigan, 2004). Nonetheless, it 
cannot be excluded that any similar effect could be found also if WM resources were depleted 
at retrieval; this could be matter for future investigation. Finally, in Experiment 5 it was 
confirmed that, in control condition, both positive and negative events are less likely to give 
rise to causal errors than neutral events. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1    Summary of the findings and their implications 
 
Through five experiments, I explored two general questions concerning the occurrence of 
false memories for emotional material. The first question was whether emotional events are 
protected against inferential false memories (i.e. memory errors consisting of falsely 
remembering scenes as a consequence of inferential processes; they include causal and gap-
filling errors) compared to non-emotional events, in line with the notion that emotional 
material improves reality monitoring and reduces memory distortions (Kensinger & Corkin, 
2004; Kensinger & Schacter 2005, 2006b, 2008; Pesta et al., 2001). To this end, a false 
memory paradigm based on pictorial scripted material was created, following the method 
suggested by Hannigan and Reinitz (2001) and Lyons and colleagues (2010). Results showed 
that emotional events were indeed associated to a reduced probability of committing inferential 
false memories compared to neutral events; the finding specifically concerned causal errors, 
(which are indeed temporally contiguous and logically related to the specific event that is either 
emotional or non-emotional), while no effect of valence was found on gap-filling errors, except 
in one experiment. The second and most important question was whether there are conditions 
that moderate the effect of valence on the probability of incur false memories; it was found that 
such conditions exist, and include both encoding/post-encoding manipulations and individual 
differences. 
Experiment 1 examined the effect of post-encoding elaboration of neutral vs. negative 
material on false memory production. Rehearsing material after encoding is known to enhance 
the subsequent probability of committing false memory, due to the tendency to rely on the gist 
of the material when recollecting (Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Gallo, 2006). Thus, it was 
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hypothesized that this would also happen for scripted events. Crucially, it was hypothesized 
that negative events would be especially susceptible to false memory after re-elaboration (i.e. 
to a higher extent compared to neutral events), due to the fact that emotionally charged events 
are more likely to be the focus of re-thinking and elaborative processes (e.g. Walker et al., 
2009); furthermore, it is known that emotional elaboration of events leads to higher false 
memories (Drivdahl et al., 2009). Results from a sample of undergraduate students were 
consistent with the hypotheses; in particular, while participants who were distracted during a 
15 minutes retention interval were less likely to incur causal errors for negative than neutral 
events, participants who were encouraged to think back and reconstruct what they had just seen 
showed the opposite pattern. Furthermore, consistently with hypotheses, an overall increase in 
gap-filling errors was observed in the experimental group. Finally, negative events were indeed 
more likely to be mentioned in written reports during the post-encoding elaboration phase. 
Accuracy was not affected. Implications for the forensic field could be derived; in particular, it 
was suggested that free, unguided re-elaboration of witnessed events should be prevented, and 
even repeated forensic interviews should be treated with caution, especially for emotionally 
charged events. 
Experiments 2 and 3 were focused on the effects of symptoms of emotional disorders at 
the sub-clinical level. Previous research had shown that individuals suffering from emotional 
disorders are more likely to incur false memories for negative material (e.g., Howe & Malone, 
2011; Joormann et al., 2009); this was explained in terms of a higher baseline activation of 
negative concepts in depression (Howe & Malone, 2011). However, it was still unclear what 
would happen at the sub-clinical level, in the case of anxiety, and with positive material; 
furthermore, only the DRM paradigm had been previously used. In experiments 2 and 3 
participants were selected through wide screenings among 17-to-19-years-old high school 
students; using the Q-Pad questionnaire (Sica et al., 2011) I selected participants who were 
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high (i.e. over the 80th percentile) on both the anxiety and depression scales (Experiment 2) or 
were high on the anxiety scale but around or below the median (as reported for the 
standardization sample) in the depression scale (Experiment 3); in both cases, control groups 
consisted of youths who were around or below the median in both the depression and the 
anxiety scales. In Experiment 2, it was shown that participants with strong internalizing traits 
are more likely to misremember the causal antecedent (i.e. to incur an inferential false 
memory) when the outcome is negative than when it is neutral, while control participants show 
the opposite pattern (i.e. they are protected by negative material). In Experiment 3, the previous 
result was replicated, and it was shown that it may be specific for anxiety (i.e. also when 
concurrent depression levels are low), and that it is only found for negative (but not positive) 
material. 
Experiments 2 and 3 importantly indicated that a) also symptoms of emotional disorders 
at the sub-clinical level imply increased false memories for negative material, b) that this 
phenomenon could also be found in the case of trait anxiety, and c) that it is specific for 
negative material. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that, as the critical element in this 
paradigm is not emotional itself (but it is linked to an emotional event) the hypothesis of a pre-
activation of negative concepts in emotional disorders (Howe & Malone, 2011) could not be 
applied to the present case. Rather, an explanation based on the over-elaboration of negative 
material in individuals with high levels of anxiety and depression (see Gotlib & Joormann, 
2010) could be more appropriate; indeed, it is interesting to note that the pattern of results in 
Experiments 2 and 3 was somehow similar to that of Experiment 1 (i.e. individuals with 
internalizing traits behave similar to individuals who have re-elaborated the viewed material). 
Finally, these experiments suggested that individuals suffering from high levels of internalizing 
symptoms could create distorted memories of the events, especially if they are negatively 
charged; persons with internalizing symptoms may thus be increasingly tangled up in an 
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illusory representation of the reality, which may have critical implications when they are 
invited to re-think of and describe past events, for example when receiving clinical support. 
In Experiment 4 and 5 the focus was on the role of working memory (WM) capacity. 
WM is known to be crucial for memory binding, which allows to create vivid representations 
of events (Mitchell, Johnson, Raye, & Greene, 2004), and thus to avoid false memories (e.g. 
Peters, Jelicic, Verbeek, & Merckelbach, 2007; Reinitz & Hannigan, 2004). However, it was 
still unclear what role WM has in the case of emotional material. It is known that negative 
material interferes with WM control, reducing performance (Osaka, Yaoi, Minamoto, & Osaka, 
2013). Therefore, negative material should lead to increased memory errors; however, the 
opposite is typically observed, as widely reviewed. It was thus hypothesized that negative 
material could have both “protective” (via higher distinctiveness, verbatim encoding, and so 
on), and “adverse” (via interference with WM control) effects on the production of false 
memories. While normally the protective effects of negative material is observed, the impairing 
effects could emerge when baseline WM capacity is reduced. In Experiment 4, a large group of 
undergraduates was administered the false memory paradigm in basic conditions, and their 
WM capacity was subsequently measured using an active WM task (De Beni et al., 1998). 
Results showed a significant interaction between WM capacity and emotionality of the material 
on the production of causal errors, such that while causal errors were relatively unaffected by 
WM in the positive and neutral conditions, in the negative condition they tended to be 
relatively fewer as WM increased. To further clarify this pattern of results, Experiment 5 was 
conducted. In this experiment, half of the participants (WM-Load group) encoded the scripted 
material while concurrently doing a double task, which was intended to interfere with the 
central executive component of their WM system (Baddeley, 2000). Results showed that 
occurrence of false memories was overall higher in the WM-Load group than in the control 
group (matched by a decrease in accuracy). However, this increase in false memories was 
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larger in the negative than in the neutral and positive conditions, thus confirming the 
importance of good WM capacity to protect against inferential false memories for negative 
events. Finally, Experiment 5 suggested that the role of WM in warding off (negative) false 
memories is crucial during the encoding phase, i.e. when the event is first processed and stored 
in memory, rather than at retrieval. 
As for the general conclusions, it was shown that emotional scripted events (both 
negative and positive) are normally protected against inferential false memories (and especially 
against causal errors) compared to neutral scripted events. Importantly, however, this does not 
hold true in any condition; indeed, especially in the case of negative events, the “protective” 
effect is disrupted – and sometimes even reversed – under certain conditions, which include 
post-encoding elaboration of viewed material, strong presence of internalizing symptoms at the 
sub-clinical level (and especially of trait anxiety), and low or reduced capacity of WM during 
the encoding. 
 
5.2    Limitations and suggestions for future research 
 
Although the present dissertation offers novel evidence with important theoretical and 
applied implications, and highlights the opportunity of using a new, highly ecological 
paradigm to study inferential false memories, several limitations emerged, and a series of other 
aspects might be addressed in future research. While some of the issues were presented in the 
Discussion section of each single experiment, here I focus on more general aspects. 
First, the single roles of valence and arousal, as well as other potentially relevant 
properties of the stimuli, were not systematically explored. In particular, the emotional 
outcomes (both negative and positive) were always associated to high arousal. This was 
primarily decided in order to keep the paradigm simple, but also to resemble real life as well as 
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potentially forensic-relevant emotional events (particularly in the case of negative events). 
However, it is inherently difficult to create pictorial material in the form of brief episodes that 
include specific cause-effect patterns conveying low-arousal emotions, such as quiet sadness, 
melancholy, or serenity. Nonetheless, such an effort would be worthwhile, as it has been 
reported that valence and arousal may act upon memory through different mechanisms (e.g. 
Kensinger, 2004). Another limitation lies in that positive outcomes, although more arousing 
than the neutral ones, were not as arousing as the negative outcomes; therefore, one could not 
completely rule out that some of the reported effects concerning interactions with valence 
(specifically in Experiments 3–5) were in fact driven, at least in part, by arousal. Furthermore, 
other important stimuli properties should also be considered in future research. In particular, 
the role of distinctiveness should be taken into account. One hypothesis is that emotional 
material reduces the occurrence of false memories because its distinctiveness allows for a 
better encoding (e.g. Kensinger & Corkin, 2004; Kensinger & Schacter, 2006b; Palmer & 
Dodson, 2009). Therefore, to better understand why this “protective” effect is sometimes 
nullified or even reversed (as it has been shown in the present dissertation), it would be 
important to include outcomes that are distinctive but non-emotional along with the positive 
and negative ones; only then it will be possible to draw firm conclusions about the actual role 
of emotionality. 
Another general issue is that the degree of evidence supporting the reported effects was 
not always large. Indeed, in Experiments 1, 4 and 5, evidence was positive but not strong, and 
the effects were modest in size, possibly indicating that the paradigm is still to be refined, but 
also that a large portion of the variability in the propensity to incur inferential false memories 
remains unexplained.  
With regard to the type of false memory, while it was expected that valence would 
mainly (if not only) affect causal errors, adjusting the paradigm in order to systematically 
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examine the effect of valence on gap-filling errors would importantly extend the scope of the 
research. Indeed, causal and gap-filling errors are thought to stem from partially different 
reconstructive processes (Hannigan & Reinitz, 2001; Lyons et al., 2010), which could be 
differently affected by valence. One option would be to vary valence of the episodes 
thematically, following a procedure similar to that of Laney and colleagues (2004); indeed, 
these authors showed a nearly identical sequence of slides to all participants, and manipulated 
valence by presenting a verbal description of the episode (either negatively arousing or neutral) 
during the slide show at the encoding phase. Adapting this procedure to the present paradigm, 
could facilitate the study of how valence affects not only memory errors concerning specific 
events (i.e. causal errors) but also memory errors deriving from the understanding of the 
episode in its entirety (i.e. gap-filling errors). More in general, as all the experiments reported 
in the present dissertation have novel aspects in terms of both the paradigm that was used and 
the evidence that they offer, it would be important to systematically examine the similarities 
and differences that could be found with false memories elicited by traditional procedures (for 
example, by conceptually replicating the experiments presented in the current thesis but using 
the DRM paradigm); doing so would have important theoretical implications, as it would shed 
light on how valence affects the specific mechanisms that underlie each type of false memory. 
Finally, all the experiments in the present dissertation were conducted on young adults. 
This is a specific population that may have particular characteristics. In fact, the same applies 
to most of the research on emotional false memories; however, studies on children (Howe, 
2007) and older adults (Kensinger & Corkin, 2004) were also conducted. Examining inferential 
false memories in a larger age range would be important. For example, Lyons and colleagues 
(2010) found that causal errors increase with development during childhood, arguing that this 
increase is due to the fact that the memory processes underling causal errors formation develop 
throughout the school years. However, it is not known what happens with emotional events; 
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importantly, WM resources are not fully developed in children, and they have been found 
critical in the case of negative false memories (Experiments 4 and 5). On the same line, 
inferential false memories for emotional events in older adults could be examined. Indeed, 
older adults are known to have an overall deficit in WM abilities (e.g. Borella, Carretti, & De 
Beni, 2008), which may predict increased negative false memories; on the other hand, 
however, older adults are known to have a bias towards positive material (and away from 
negative one; see e.g. Charles, Mather, & Carstensen, 2003; Mather & Carstensen, 2005), 
which may predict increased elaboration and false memories for positively charged events. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A – Examples of scripts used for the false memory paradigm 
1. Example of the “dinner script” 
Encoded photographs 
 
Tested photographs 
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2. Example of the “dating / meeting a friend script” 
Encoded photographs 
 
Tested photographs 
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Appendix B – Questionnaire used for assessing internalizing symptoms 
 
The following items were used (in the original Italian version) to assess levels of 
internalizing symptoms in Experiments 2–5. They correspond to the anxiety and depression 
scales of the Q-Pad questionnaire (Sica, Chiri, Favilli, & Marchetti, 2011); responses are given 
on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 4 based on the extent to which each sentence describes 
one’s own situation. 
 
Anxiety scale 
“I often feel tense.” 
“When I am tense, I have difficulty breathing.” 
“I am almost always worried about something.” 
“I am often so nervous that I can feel my heart pounding.” 
“I am worried about things that most people are not worried about.” 
“I think that I show signs of much stress.” 
“Lately I have found it difficult to sleep because of my worries.” 
“I often feel worried and I do not know why.” 
“I am bothered by thoughts I cannot get rid of.” 
 
Depression scale 
“Lately I have been feeling sad for most of the time.” 
“I have lost interest in things that I used to like.” 
“Things went from bad to worse.” 
“Lately I have felt like time does not flow.” 
“Sad thoughts keep me awake at night.” 
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“I no longer get pleasure from activities as I used to.” 
“It does not matter what I do, things will not improve.” 
“I feel like I cannot get rid of my sadness.” 
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Appendix C – Example of the stimuli used for assessing working memory capacity 
 
The following list of words (translated from Italian) are taken from the Categorization 
Working Memory Span task (Borella et al., 2007, adapted from De Beni et al., 1998), which 
was used as a measure of individual working memory capacity in Experiment 4. 
Participants were required to read aloud each word, to press the space bar when they read 
the name of an animal, and to remember the last word in each list (which was followed by a 
square). Participants were then asked to repeat the to-be-remembered words when a “???” 
appeared. 
 
Example – SPAN = 3 
WOLF      ASH      COUCH      WAVE      PLATE         [square] 
GERANIUM      BOX      RABBIT      CHAIR      CHERRY         [square]                                  
HOUSE      COW      DYKE      CUBE      JACKET         [square]             
??? 
Example – SPAN = 4 
SNAKE      SHOVEL      PENCIL      PLANT      CAKE         [square]             
MUM      LILY      GOAT      LEATHER      SEED         [square]             
WIND      SPIDER      SKULL      TRAIN      PAN         [square]             
SHIELD      WIFE      CUP      WALNUT      CATERPILLAR         [square]             
??? 
 
 
Note. Only for illustrative purposes in the current example, the words indicating animals have 
been highlighted in italics, and the final word in each list has been highlighted in bold; 
however, all words were presented in plain text to participants. The original Italian words are 
all bi- to tri-syllabic and of medium-to-high frequency in the Italian language. 
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SUMMARY IN ITALIAN / RIASSUNTO IN ITALIANO 
 
Come nota Daniel Schacter (1999), gli errori di memoria non sono solo “errori”. Essi 
vanno piuttosto considerati come effetti collaterali di caratteristiche altrimenti utili e adattive 
della nostra memoria. La memoria umana è infatti costruttiva e ricostruttiva, immagazzina 
schemi (Alba & Hasher, 1983; Bartlett, 1932) piuttosto che semplici sensazioni, coglie il 
“succo” degli eventi, ed è continuamente impegnata ad attribuire un significato a ciò che 
accade (Schacter, 2012). Ciò implica che la nostra memoria immagazzina più di quanto le 
venga effettivamente presentato. In effetti, come è stato ampiamente dimostrato dalla ricerca, 
le distorsioni della memoria e i falsi ricordi —spesso vividi e dettagliati— sono un fatto 
piuttosto comune nella vita quotidiana (per es. Loftus, 2005; Schacter, 2001). 
Le emozioni influenzano potentemente la memoria, spesso con effetti contrapposti. Di 
solito, il ricordo degli eventi emotivi è più duraturo e accurato rispetto al ricordo di eventi 
ordinari (Christianson, 1992; Kensinger & Schacter, 2008). Tuttavia ciò non è necessariamente 
vero in qualsiasi condizione. Per esempio, in condizioni di forte attivazione emotiva (arousal), 
o quando un elemento attivante ed estremamente saliente appare nella scena (ad esempio 
un’arma), il ricordo può restringersi agli aspetti centrali, trascurando i dettagli periferici 
(Christianson & Loftus, 1991; Reisberg & Heuer, 2004). Anche nel caso dei falsi ricordi le 
emozioni hanno effetti complessi (Kaplan, Van Damme, Levine, & Loftus, 2015). Per quanto il 
materiale emotivo, specialmente negativo, in molti casi faciliti il monitoraggio di realtà, 
riducendo di conseguenza il rischio di falsi ricordi (Kensinger & Corkin, 2004; Kensinger & 
Schacter 2005, 2006; Pesta, Murphy, & Sanders, 2001), è possibile anche che le emozioni 
abbiano l’effetto opposto, causando più ricordi scorretti (Brainerd, Stein, Silveira, Rohenkohl, 
& Reyna, 2008; Gallo, Foster, & Johnson, 2009). 
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Negli ultimi due decenni sono stati studiati soprattutto i falsi ricordi di tipo associativo, 
facendo ampio uso del paradigma Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM; Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995; si veda Gallo, 2010, per una rassegna), che è basato su liste di parole 
semanticamente relate. Alcuni studi recenti sui falsi ricordi col DRM hanno mostrato che le 
liste di parole negative generano più falsi ricordi di quelle neutre (per es., Brainerd et al., 
2008). Tuttavia, ciò sembra dovuto alla più forte densità semantica posseduta dalle liste 
emotive (l’emozione stessa è un “collante” che unisce semanticamente gli stimoli), il che 
causerebbe un aumento dei falsi ricordi di tipo associativo studiati dal DRM (Talmi & 
Moscovith, 2004). In effetti, quando la forza associativa che lega le parole all’interno di 
diverse liste è uguale, il fatto che siano emotive (sia positive che negative) sembra proteggerle 
dai falsi ricordi rispetto alle liste neutre (Palmer & Dodson, 2009). Esistono comunque anche 
altri tipi di falsi ricordi. In particolare, i falsi ricordi basati sulle inferenze sono di grande 
interesse per la comprensione dei processi ricostruttivi della memoria, ma anche per le loro 
applicazioni potenzialmente immediate allo studio della testimonianza oculare (Hannigan & 
Reinitz, 2001). Due tipi di falsi ricordi inferenziali sono gli errori di “gap-filling” e gli errori di 
inferenza causale. I primi si riferiscono al ricordo erroneo di un elemento – o eventualmente di 
un intero evento – che è tipico di un dato contesto, mentre i secondi si riferiscono al falso 
ricordo del preciso antecedente causale di un fatto del quale, in realtà, è stata vista solo la 
conseguenza (Hannigan & Reinitz, 2001). 
Nella mia tesi ho investigato per la prima volta gli effetti delle emozioni sulla produzione 
di falsi ricordi inferenziali, ponendo particolare attenzione alle condizioni che moderano questi 
effetti. Per condurre la ricerca ho creato del materiale pittorico organizzato in forma di “script”, 
adattando un paradigma precedentemente usato da Hannigan e Reinitz (2001; si veda anche 
Lyons, Ghetti, & Cornoldi, 2010, and Mirandola, Paparella, Re, & Ghetti, 2012, per 
applicazioni più recenti). Nello specifico, ho creato sequenze di fotografie che rappresentano 
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eventi tipici della realtà quotidiana (o appunto “script”), ciascuno dei quali presenta alla fine 
diverse conseguenze, mutuamente esclusive, che differiscono per valenza e attivazione 
emotiva. La fotografia che rappresenta lo specifico antecedente causale di tutte le conseguenze 
non viene mostrato nella fase di codifica, ma successivamente presentato in una prova di 
riconoscimento. Sono stati esaminati anche gli errori di tipo “gap-filling” e l’accuratezza 
complessiva. 
La mia ricerca è motivata da due quesiti di fondo. Primo, se anche i falsi ricordi 
inferenziali siano generalmente meno frequenti nel caso di eventi emotivi che di eventi non-
emotivi, coerentemente con l’evidenza prevalente che il materiale emotivo riduca le distorsioni 
di memoria (Kensinger & Schacter 2005; Kensinger, 2007). Secondo e più importante quesito, 
ho esaminato se questo eventuale effetto “protettivo” venga moderato da particolari condizioni, 
considerando sia differenze individuali che l’effetto delle manipolazioni sperimentali. 
Nell’Esperimento 1 mi sono concentrato sugli effetti della rielaborazione del materiale 
dopo la codifica. È noto che ripetere più volte il materiale dopo la codifica aumenta la 
probabilità di commettere falsi ricordi, a causa della tendenza a “ricostruire” il ricordo 
basandosi sul “nucleo” del significato del materiale studiato (Roediger & McDermott, 1995; 
Gallo, 2006). Ho ipotizzato che ciò sarebbe accaduto anche per gli eventi presentati in forma di 
script, specialmente nel caso degli errori di “gap-filling”. Inoltre, ho ipotizzato che gli eventi 
emotivi sarebbero stati più suscettibili all’aumento di falsi ricordi dovuto alla rielaborazione, 
dato che essi, per la loro salienza, vengono richiamati alla mente più facilmente e più spesso 
(Christianson & Engelberg, 1999; Walker, Skowronksi, Gibbons, Vogl, & Ritchie, 2009); si sa 
inoltre che la rielaborazione degli aspetti emotivi degli eventi conduce a maggiori falsi ricordi 
(Drivdahl, Zaragoza, & Learned, 2009). I risultati ottenuti su un campione di studenti 
universitari hanno mostrato che, mentre i partecipanti che venivano distratti durante l’intervallo 
di ritenzione (partecipanti di controllo) erano relativamente protetti dagli errori causali per 
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eventi negativi rispetto agli eventi neutri, i partecipanti che venivano invitati a ripensare e a 
ricostruire ciò che avevano visto (partecipanti sperimentali) presentavano il pattern opposto. 
Inoltre, coerentemente con le ipotesi, si è osservato un aumento generalizzato degli errori di 
“gap-filling” nel gruppo sperimentale. L’accuratezza invece non differiva. 
Negli Esperimenti 2 e 3 mi sono concentrato sugli effetti dei sintomi di disturbi emotivi a 
livello sub-clinico. Precedenti ricerche hanno mostrato che le persone che soffrono di disturbi 
emotivi in generale commettono più falsi ricordi per materiale negativo (per es. Howe & 
Malone, 2011; Joormann, Teachman, & Gotlib, 2009). Un’ipotesi è che ciò sia dovuto a una 
maggiore attivazione di base dei concetti negativi nelle persone con depressione (Howe & 
Malone, 2011). Tuttavia, un limite dei precedenti studi è che hanno utilizzato il paradigma 
DRM, per cui non è chiaro se lo stesso accada anche per altri tipi di falsi ricordi. Inoltre, non è 
chiaro cosa accada a livello sub-clinico (è infatti possibile che disturbi sufficientemente intensi 
da raggiungere una soglia clinica presentino effetti specifici, diversi da quelli del 
corrispondente tratto nella popolazione generale), cosa accada nel caso di sintomi d’ansia 
(un’altra condizione che comporta un bias di memoria e un’elaborazione preferenziale per il 
materiale emotivo; Mitte, 2008), e con il materiale positivo. Negli Esperimenti 2 e 3 i 
partecipanti sono stati selezionati tramite ampi screening su studenti di scuola superiore tra i 17 
e i 19 anni d’età, utilizzando il questionario Q-Pad (Sica, Chiri, Favilli, & Marchetti, 2011). 
Nell’Esperimento 2 ho selezionato partecipanti che avevano elevati punteggi (oltre l’80esimo 
percentile) sia nella scala di ansia che in quella di depressione, mentre nell’Esperimento 3 ho 
selezionato partecipanti che avevano elevati punteggi di ansia ma punteggi di depressione 
attorno o sotto la mediana. In entrambi gli esperimenti, i gruppi di controllo erano composti da 
giovani che si collocavano attorno o sotto la mediana sia nella scala di ansia che in quella di 
depressione. Nell’Esperimento 2 si è mostrato che i partecipanti con forti tratti internalizzanti 
hanno maggiore probabilità di commettere falsi ricordi per gli antecedenti causali quando la 
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conseguenza è negativa rispetto a quando è neutra, mentre i partecipanti di controllo 
presentavano l’effetto opposto (erano quindi protetti dal materiale negativo). Nell’Esperimento 
3 sono stati replicati i risultati precedenti, e si è mostrato che l’effetto è specifico per l’ansia 
(cioè si trova anche quando i livelli di depressione corrispondono alla media della popolazione 
o sono al di sotto). Inoltre, si è mostrato che l’effetto è specifico per il materiale negativo (e 
non si trova per il materiale positivo). Gli Esperimenti 2 e 3 hanno mostrato che anche i 
sintomi internalizzanti a livello sub-clinico implicano elevati livelli di falsi ricordi per 
materiale negativo, che questo fenomeno si può trovare anche nel caso specifico dell’ansia di 
tratto, e che è ristretto al materiale negativo. Inoltre, è interessante notare che l’elemento 
critico, cioè l’antecedente causale, non è emotivamente carico di per sé, ma è collegato ad 
eventi emotivi. Per questo l’ipotesi della pre-attivazione dei concetti negativi nel caso dei 
disturbi emotivi (Howe & Malone, 2011) in questo caso non può essere applicato. La 
spiegazione potrebbe piuttosto avere a che fare con una sovra-elaborazione del materiale 
negativo negli individui con alti livelli di ansia e di depressione (si veda Gotlib & Joormann, 
2010). In effetti, è interessante notare che il quadro dei risultati negli Esperimenti 2 e 3 
assomiglia a quello dell’Esperimento 1 (con i partecipanti con forti tratti internalizzanti che si 
comportano in modo simili a quelli che hanno rielaborato il materiale). 
Negli Esperimenti 4 e 5 mi sono concentrato sul ruolo della Memoria di Lavoro (ML; 
Baddeley, 2000, 2012). Si sa che la ML ha un ruolo cruciale nel “binding”, cioè nell’unire 
assieme i diversi aspetti di un ricordo, il che che permette di creare delle rappresentazioni 
vivide di un evento (Mitchell, Jonhson, Raye, & Greene, 2004), e dunque di evitare i falsi 
ricordi (Peters, Jelicic, Verbeek, & Merckelbach, 2007). Tuttavia, non è chiaro cosa succeda 
nel caso del materiale negativo. Si sa che il materiale negativo tende a interferire con la 
capacità di controllo della ML, riducendone la prestazione (Osaka, Yaoi, Minamoto, & Osaka, 
2013). Di conseguenza, il materiale negativo dovrebbe portare a maggiori falsi ricordi, tuttavia 
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di solito si osserva l’opposto (Kensinger, 2007). È dunque possibile che il materiale negativo 
abbia sia effetti “protettivi” (dati da una maggiore distintività e da una più accurata codifica; 
Kensinger & Corkin, 2004) che effetti “avversi” (interferendo con il controllo della ML) nei 
confronti dei falsi ricordi. Anche se normalmente prevalgono gli effetti protettivi, gli effetti 
avversi potrebbero emergere quando le capacità di base di ML sono ridotte. Nell’Esperimento 
4 un ampio gruppo di studenti universitari è stato sottoposto al paradigma dei falsi ricordi 
inferenziali emotivi in condizioni di base, e la loro capacità di ML è stata misurata tramite un 
apposito compito attivo (De Beni, Palladino, Pazzaglia, & Cornoldi, 1998). I risultati hanno 
mostrato una interazione significativa tra capacità di ML e valenza del materiale sulla 
produzione di falsi ricordi. In particolare mentre i falsi ricordi per eventi positivi e neutri non 
erano particolarmente legati alla ML, quest’ultima sembrava avere un effetto protettivo sui 
falsi ricordi per eventi negativi. Per chiarire meglio il quadro dei risultati è stato condotto 
l’Esperimento 5. In questo esperimento metà dei partecipanti (gruppo sperimentale) doveva 
visionare il materiale mentre conduceva un doppio compito inteso ad interferire con la 
componente dell’esecutivo centrale della loro ML (Baddeley, 2000). I risultati hanno mostrato 
che la probabilità di commettere falsi ricordi era complessivamente più alta nel gruppo 
sperimentale rispetto a quello di controllo (si notava anche una generale caduta 
nell’accuratezza). Tuttavia, questo incremento nei falsi ricordi era più grande nel caso negli 
eventi negativi che in quello degli eventi positivi o neutri, confermando così l’importanza di 
avere una buona capacità di ML per essere protetti contro gli errori inferenziali nel caso degli 
eventi negativi. 
Per quanto riguarda le conclusioni generali, attraverso cinque esperimenti ho mostrato 
che, in genere, gli eventi emotivi (sia positivi che negativi) sono protetti contro gli errori 
inferenziali (specialmente contro gli errori causali) a confronto con gli eventi neutri. Ciò è 
coerente con la letteratura. La cosa più importante, però, è che questo non succede in qualsiasi 
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condizione. Esistono condizioni, specialmente nel caso degli eventi negativi, nelle quali questo 
effetto “protettivo” è annullato, se non capovolto. Tali condizioni includono la rielaborazione 
del materiale visto, la forte presenza di sintomi internalizzanti, anche a livello sub-clinico (e 
specialmente di ansia di tratto), e basse o ridotte capacità di ML al momento della codifica. 
 
(Please see the section “5.1 Summary of the findings and their implications” for a 
corresponding summary in English.) 
